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The "Cultural Revolution" in China

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Events in China since the end of 1965 have been provoking lively interest all over the world. Developments are being followed with close attention by friends and foes of the Chinese people alike. Naturally, everyone is trying to fathom the true meaning and nature of these events, to get to the bottom of the reasons for them and comprehend the aims of those who have turned China into an arena of stormy and uncontrollable passions. In short, people everywhere want to find a clear answer to the question: Where is China heading?

This tremendous interest in developments in China is all too natural. It is, after all, a question of a nation that has accomplished a great revolution, a nation that has proclaimed its goal to be the building of a socialist society.

Reactions to the events, and their political appraisals are highly divergent. In Peking they are officially called the "great proletarian cultural revolution," "an important stage in the development of the world revolution." Outside China other, and frequently diametrically opposite, views are voiced. There are some in whose minds the Chinese events bring back memories of the dark days of the fascist upsurge in Germany. Others believe that the Chinese version of the "cultural

revolution" is a logical and normal phenomenon for socialist society.

There are some who feel that by letting loose irresponsible teenagers, the "Red Guards," and giving them free rein, Mao Tse-tung is using them as a weapon in the struggle against the bureaucrats entrenched in the party and government machinery in China who are obstructing the implementation of his ideas. Others believe that a struggle for power has broken out in Peking and that the mounting conflict between the warring factions may even develop into civil war.

Indeed, the organisers of the "cultural revolution" themselves have been terming it "extraordinary," and "without precedent in world history." To this it should be added that the various appraisals are also influenced by the differing politico-ideological positions of the commentators themselves, their personal interpretations of the ideals of socialism and communism, their attitude (friendly or hostile) to socialism and Marxism-Leninism. Another factor is the shortage of information from China itself and the inadequate knowledge of the specific facts relating to the history of the inner-Party struggle in China.

Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Communists everywhere are already vigorously dissociating themselves from the Chinese "cultural revolution" and unanimously declaring that it has nothing in common with either Marxism-Leninism or scientific socialism, that it has already caused immense harm to the interests of world socialism, the international workers' and liberation movement, and has slowed down the social advance of the Chinese people.

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" has been shown by facts to be directed against the proletariat, against culture and against revolution.

It is a tragedy for the Chinese people and one can only express sincere sympathy with them now that this great trouble has been visited upon them by the Maoist group.

How fair are these categoric assessments? Are they justified? To what extent do they help get to the essence of the political campaign at present underway in China? Is not undue haste being displayed in drawing conclusions and making appraisals about a phenomenon whose development is as yet far from complete? In order to give at least some kind of reply to these questions it is essential to consider the actual facts relating to the emergence and development of the "cultural revolution."

I.

The first sign of the beginning of the "cultural revolution" is considered by the Chinese press to have been an article written by Yao Wen-yuan and published in November 1965 in the Shanghai *Wen Hui Pao*. The article criticised the play, *The Dismissal of Hai Jui*, by the noted historian and playwright, Wu Han. In it the author portrayed a high Ming Dynasty official of the sixteenth century who disagreed with the Emperor's policies, condemned them and stood up for the peasants. Notably, addressing the Emperor, Hai Jui once said: "In the past you did some good things but what are you doing now? Correct your mistakes and let the people live happily. You have committed too many errors, yet you think you are right in everything and therefore reject criticism."

The publication of the play in 1961 provoked a lively discussion among historians, philosophers and literary critics in China. At first the discus-

sion centred around the question whether there could be any good honest officials in the epoch of feudalism. Some participants in the discussion argued that although on the whole the feudal officials had oppressed and persecuted the working people, there could, as an exception, have been some fair and humane people among them. Others rejected any such possibility out of hand and declared that Wu Han was wrong to whitewash and glorify a feudal official. True, there were some even harsher voices. Some authors accused Wu Han of "calling upon the Chinese peasants to reject the people's communes and return to individual farming." Despite such charges the discussion was outwardly quite normal: the views of one side were printed along with the arguments of the other. In fact the discussion seemed to be proceeding in full conformity with the well-known line, "Let a thousand flowers bloom, let a thousand schools compete."

Yao Wen-yuan's article put an end to all these pseudo-scholarly disputes. Yao Wen-yuan declared unequivocally that the play had nothing whatsoever to do with history, that it related directly to the present. He levelled a political accusation against Wu Han, calling him a champion and advocate of the "rightist opportunists" who had been condemned in 1959 for disagreement with the policy of the "great leap," the people's communes and small-scale iron and steel smelting. The critic declared that modern China had nothing at all to learn from Hai Jui, whatever virtues he may have had. Yao Wen-yuan ascribed to Wu Han a desire "to revive the criminal domination of the landowners," and classified him among the "filth" that had raised its head in China in 1961 when "the country was experiencing temporary economic difficulties owing to the natural calamities

ties that had occurred three years in succession."

Yao Wen-yuan's article was reprinted by the *People's Daily* (the Party organ) and other central newspapers and magazines. In the sphere of propaganda it was treated as an official directive, partly because of rumours that it had been written and published on the direct instructions of Mao Tse-tung himself. The political significance of the article was also heightened by the fact that its author was a responsible official in the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army of China. This was by no means fortuitous.

From the spring of 1966, the army and its central organ, the newspaper *Chieh-fang Chu Pao* (Liberation Army Daily), began to feature articles of a clearly directive nature, gradually ousting and relegating to second place the party organ, the *People's Daily*. It was the *Liberation Army Daily* that was the first to point out that an "anti-Party, anti-socialist black line" was active on the cultural front in China which it was necessary to "root out completely." The basic role in the eradication of this "black line" was assigned to the army, for, as the *Liberation Army Daily* emphasised on April 18, 1966, it is "our army that is the main weapon of the proletariat." Although the paper wrote about literature and the arts, and about culture, its editorials pursued purely political aims, which were to raise the army's importance in public affairs in China, particularly in the field of ideology. The army came out as claimant to the role of defender and propagandist of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, whose books were declared to be "supreme directives." The cultural front was but the bridge-head for an offensive to uphold Mao's ideas on the politico-ideological front. Indeed, the *Liberation Army Daily* itself

promptly said this in so many words, evidently fearing that not everyone might understand it correctly.

Early in May 1966 the paper bluntly stated that "the extensive polemics now proceeding on the cultural front is by no means a question of a few articles, plays or films, nor is it any kind of scholarly debate—it is an extremely acute class struggle, a struggle of great importance of principle in defence of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung... It is the key question of deepening and developing the socialist revolution in our country in the present stage, a question related to the situation as a whole, it is a cause of first importance touching upon the destinies and the future of our Party and state, and also upon the world revolution" (May 4, 1966). The paper hinted that there were people in authority within the Party who posed as followers of Mao's ideas, but who in actual fact were "putting up a resistance to the Party leadership and using the means at their disposal to engage in criminal anti-Party and anti-socialist intrigues." It is characteristic that the names of the "criminals" were withheld and the Chinese public could only indulge in guesswork as to the identity of those who were threatening socialism in China. Nor was the actual substance of the "criminal intrigues" specified—and this, too, provided ample grounds for the most contradictory speculation. The army paper called for increased vigilance—without, however, specifying against whom the vigilance was to be increased although the call went out not merely for a struggle, but for a "life-and-death" one. The "criminals" were charged with contacts with "the international anti-Chinese chorus of imperialism, modern revisionism and reaction of all countries."

This build-up of fear and the intimidation of the Chinese people with the untold dangers allegedly threatening them were in obvious discord with the statements of Chinese newspapers and leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to the effect that a wonderful and favourable situation had developed in the country, that in the international field Chinese diplomacy was winning one brilliant victory after another and that inside the CPC there was increasingly monolithic unity and cohesion around the great leader, Mao Tse-tung. The strange and baffling thing was that only yesterday the papers had been vaunting the victories of socialism and asserting that in China the question "who defeats whom" had been solved in favour of socialism, yet now they were stating that China was under a real threat of the "restoration of capitalism." Obviously, in reading the editorials in the army paper, more than one reader in China must have wondered what it was all about.

Soon the man who was to blame for all China's troubles was identified. He turned out to be Teng To, one of the Secretaries of the Peking Municipal Party Committee and former editor-in-chief of the *People's Daily*. Teng To, who had joined the Party in the grim days of the anti-Japanese war, enjoyed great popularity among the intellectuals as a man of profound knowledge and great erudition in matters of history, literature and art. Being a modest man, sometimes even shy, he nonetheless displayed independence in his judgements and evaluations. It was this Communist who was branded as the "ringleader of the black den" who had been "zealously pursuing an anti-Party, anti-socialist, right opportunist, i.e., revisionist, line and acting as the mouthpiece of the reactionary classes and the

right-wing opportunists in their attacks against the Party."

The author of the critical article lambasting Teng To and his friends was the selfsame Yao Wen-yuan. He certainly cannot be accused of meanness in handing out labels.

For some time Teng To was the main target for criticism, and this gave fresh impetus to the development of the "cultural revolution." It is interesting to note that the articles, essays and parables which came under fire had all been written by Teng To in 1960-61 and so it appears that it took no less than five years for the perspicacious critics, inspired by the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, to get to the bottom of the "reactionary" substance of his writings. Co-authors with Teng To in many of these essays were Wu Han and Liao Mo-sha. They published them in the Peking magazine *Front Line* and the newspaper *Peking Evening News* under the general heading, "The Three Family Village." Altogether they published 150 articles.

Teng To and his friends were charged with having waged a "struggle against the ideas of Mao Tse-tung" under the guise of "disseminating knowledge" and with having made an attempt to "corrupt the cadres and the youth."

To this end they had resorted to allegorical language, "using," Yao Wen-yuan wrote, "history," "knowledge" and "interesting things" as camouflage to "allay the revolutionary vigilance of the people, to delude broad sections of readers and thus to broaden their sphere of influence."

It was evidently because Teng To's essays contained various historical parallels, abstract discourses, parables and fables that Mao Tse-tung and his aides failed immediately to fathom their true meaning. Or perhaps they had understood all

along but thought the time had not yet come to condemn him. Maybe at the outset they were even unsure of their strength.

On November 10, 1961, for instance, Teng To published in the *Front Line* an essay called "Great Empty Talk," in which he lashed out against empty speeches and vapid debates, and wrote, "It cannot be denied that in some cases great empty talk is inevitable and therefore in a certain sense necessary. But it would be particularly dreadful if it were to become universal and begin to develop into a speciality. Still worse if the future generation were to be inculcated with the habit of 'great empty talk' and if a whole group of such specialists were trained."

As examples of "great empty talk" Teng To cited the following children's poem:

The heaven is our father,
The earth is our mother,
The sun is our governess,
The east wind is our benefactor,
The west wind is our enemy.

Teng To's essay seemed devoid of any specific target, for Mao is not the only politician afflicted with empty talk, but the trouble is that the poem contained references to "the east wind" and "the west wind," and these expressions were first brought into play by none other than Mao Tse-tung himself. For this reason Yao Wen-yuan declared that "Teng To has cynically branded as 'empty talk' the Marxist-Leninist scientific proposition that 'the East Wind prevails over the West Wind.'" Thereby he "is berating not a children's poem but the ideological weapon of our Party." Teng To's objective, the critic wrote, was "to slanderously attack as 'empty talk' the great ideas

of Mao Tse-tung, which are leading us forward, and to compel us to reject these ideas."

Great anger was also provoked by the article "Two Foreign Fables." In it Teng To commented on the fable of the Russian poet, Ivan Krylov, about the tomtit that assailed the sea and declared it was going to burn it up, and the fable by Aesop about the jumper who boasted of his feats at the competitions in Rhodes. (This is the fable that originated the famous phrase, "Here is Rhodes, go and jump.") After a summary of these fables Teng To made the following conclusions: "The facts show convincingly that braggarts make a lot of noise but do nothing practical. To this day you can meet braggarts of this kind everywhere." He went on to say that those who "imagined that by invoking the 'psychological factor' they could do anything they wanted, have ended up by banging their heads against the facts and have finally experienced failure."

In citing these pronouncements, the six critics who took up the cudgels in the *Liberation Army Daily* wrote: "At first glance it is clear to any perspicacious person that here Teng To is viciously terming our great leap a 'boast' and slanderously stating that we 'have banged our heads against the facts'." As regards the phrase "at first glance," it should be pointed out that a period of five years separated the publication of Teng To's essay and the articles by the critics, and that the direct reference to the "great leap" being a mere boast is made by the critics, not Teng To. Not everyone might have realised that Teng To's essay is hinting at the promises of "eternal happiness after three years of hard work." But thanks to the critics, it became much easier for the broad reading public to draw such a comparison.

Similarly, Teng To's remark that in ancient

times they "understood the great importance of a solicitous attitude to the labour force" was deciphered by the official critics to mean "an assertion that our Party failed to display concern for the labour force in the process of the great leap."

In one short essay Teng To referred to the disorder called amnesia and said: "Those who are afflicted with this disease... frequently fail to fulfil their promises and do not keep their word." Here, too, the official critics showed they were not to be taken in. "It is quite clear," the army paper pointed out, "that in this essay the author is foaming at the mouth and attacking our great Party." And the Peking *People's Daily* published a letter from two doctors in Shanghai who cited medical authorities to affirm that "they who practised Chinese medicine in treating the disease described by Teng To come across such symptoms as insomnia, tiredness and pain in the back, but as regards 'forgetting promises' and other symptoms of the ailment described by Teng To, it is plain that this is abuse and black words aimed against socialism."

In the course of the exposure of Teng To as the "ringleader of the black den" many "crimes" were uncovered. Their nature may be judged on the basis of an article published in the *Ta Kung Pao*. This paper cited as an example of "Teng To's struggle with the Party for the youth" an excerpt from his letter to the mother of a young girl who had failed to enter college because of poor health. "I believe," wrote Teng To, "she should study systematically at home. In the past quite a few well-known scientists and scholars have achieved success by means of this method." The *Ta Kung Pao* concluded that "Teng To was urging her to lock herself in her house and read

books so as to become a well-known scholar." "This example goes to show," the paper argued, "that Teng To adopts a bourgeois reactionary attitude and that he does his utmost to dissuade young urban intellectuals from travelling to mountain areas and the countryside to support construction in the provinces and that he opposes the appeals of the Party and Chairman Mao" (May 31, 1966).

The newspaper *Kuang Ming Daily* (June 7, 1966) took Teng To to task for his essay "This Year's Festival of Spring" which appeared in 1961. In it he had written that "soon the winter will be over with its northern freezing winds. Instead will come the warm east wind and the land will free itself from the ice and the snow." In these lines the paper saw the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat in China would soon come to an end, to be replaced by the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Another writer berated for singing the praises of spring was Yang Shu, an official of the propaganda department of the Peking Municipal Party Committee. In one of his essays he had written that the people were looking forward to the spring and that they would soon be warmed by the rays of the spring sun. In those words the critics saw "poisonous arrows launched against the Party and against socialism."

The same treatment was given to another essay by Yang Shu in which he described his impressions of strolling through the city's parks and gardens. "The blossom of the plum-tree is a harbinger of spring. All the gardens are filled with spring flowers. Spring is close at hand!" The newspaper *Kuang Ming Daily* in analysing the essay put its case squarely: "Is Yang Shu singing the praises of the socialist spring?" The answer

was clear: "No! By no means! It is plain to all that he is revealing his hopes for the restoration of capitalism this spring" (June 7, 1966).

A great deal of indignation was aroused by Yang Shu's statement that "too much glorification will lead to self-conceit." It was regarded as "an attack on the CPC and the great leader, Chairman Mao" and slander to the effect that there was a "personality cult" in China.

With the criticism of Teng To and his friends a new stage began in the development of the "cultural revolution." It became obvious that it was increasingly assuming the scale of a political campaign. True, the Chinese press asserted that Teng To and his friends were but "paper tigers" and that "you only have to drag them out into the sun for their fine nature to be revealed and for them to crumble." Yet the tone of the criticism and the constant reminder that the struggle against Teng To was "an extremely acute class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, a life-and-death struggle" indicated that the matter was far more serious. What is more, the articles in the *Liberation Army Daily* began to carry ever more frequent hints that Teng To had protectors who would be brought to book at the proper time. The papers started to recall the Hungarian events of 1956 and to declare that "the activities of the literary revisionists are a prelude to counter-revolutionary restoration" (*People's Daily*, June 2, 1966) and that unless the "black line" was combated "the dictatorship of the proletariat will be broken, the people's skies will vanish, China will change colour and capitalism will be restored" (*Kuang Ming Daily*, June 13, 1966).

In the summer of 1966 China was shaken by the sensational news that a group of royalists had

made their counter-revolutionary nest in Peking University. The group was headed by none other than the University's Rector, Lu Ping, who was also accused of attempts to smear the name of Mao Tse-tung and of a desire to restore capitalism. But there were other charges too. In 1962 he had openly dared to call for study of Soviet experience arguing that "despite its revisionism, the USSR has tremendous achievements to its credit in science and technology, as witnessed by the successes in the conquest of outer space." Lu Ping advised that "Moscow University should be taken as an example." "Students in the Geophysics Department who were lagging behind in their work were counselled to stay on at the University and not go to the villages" (*Kuang Ming Daily*, June 23, 1966).

"The line taken by Peking University in the field of education," wrote the *People's Daily* on June 4, 1966, "as its broad student masses have found, was aimed not at training continuers of the revolutionary cause, but at training reinforcements for the bourgeoisie."

Specifically, this was manifested in a letter to the newspaper from a group of graduates from the Law Department of Peking University. It turned out that at the Law Department the students spent five years studying all sorts of things but "there was no course which would have systematically and comprehensively taught us the works of Mao Tse-tung." "And what did we study?" the authors asked indignantly. "Soviet civil law, Soviet criminal law, penal and criminal law, the law of bourgeois states, the history of state and law in China, and so on. It may be said that there were plenty of subjects but there was no systematic study of the *Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung, not a word was said about them at the

lectures. We were told about law in this and that state, but not a word about the ideas of Mao Tse-tung."

A noted Marxist historian, Prof. Chien Po-tsan was fiercely criticised because he advised the students of the History Department to "master more and more historical material." It became apparent from a student's letter published in the *People's Daily* that "in order to corrupt the youth in the period when fresh students were just starting their studies, Chien Po-tsan had constantly made speeches and arranged personal exhibits of so-called 'experience of teaching methods' so as to implant anti-Marxist historical views and urge the students to vigorously rake over old paper trash. He was constantly saying that foreign bourgeois Sinologists who spent many years on the study of one problem were worthy of emulation and that this was the only way to make a detailed study of a problem and write a valuable work on history. He insidiously stated that Marx was a booklover who buried his head in books at the British Museum from nine in the morning till seven at night. Under the influence of these ideas some students also became fired with a feeling of the vastness of historical material, came to regret the brevity of life and therefore spent whole days, from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., zealously poring over books in the library.

"They gave but little thought to 'studying in the name of the revolution,' and to 'serving the people,' nor did they display interest in participating in social practices and uniting with the workers, peasants and soldiers. They sought only to master ever increasing amounts of historical material, so as to write an 'outstanding' diploma paper and thereby to 'win glory immediately' in the future. However, the result was as follows:

the more they studied, the more stupid they became and the more their health deteriorated and the more they reduced their working capacity, so that finally they could do nothing" (*People's Daily*, May 8, 1966).

The struggle against Lu Ping and other leaders and professors at Peking University developed into a wild campaign to victimise the "opponents of Mao Tse-tung." Eyewitnesses have reported that student rallies devoted to the castigation of Lu Ping culminated in pogroms. Members of the University's Party Committee and professors were beaten up. They were dragged down stairs like logs, felled to the ground with punches and had dunce caps put on their heads. One such eyewitness wrote in a letter from Peking: "The victim of the criticism has a paper cap or a wastepaper basket put on his head. The charges against him are written on the cap, the basket and on the placard hung around his neck. Looking like that the victim, standing or kneeling, appears before enraged crowd or a rally where each participant does his best to insult him by shoving him, grabbing him by the hand or even punching him. The speakers, whose vituperation is constantly interrupted with shrieks from the crowd, 'We shall defend Mao Tse-tung', 'We shall defend the Central Committee of the CPC,' 'We shall sweep away the revisionist filth down to the last vestige,' and so forth, list all the sins of the culprits. They themselves are not allowed to speak and so must accept the criticism in silence—sometimes for two and more hours running. And if they should break down and weep, the dunce caps are put back on their heads and it all begins all over again."

Another witness tells how the secretary of the Peking University library, Wan Shiu-ming, an old woman, was led out with a basket pushed right

down over her head and forced to kneel before the crowd of "revolutionary" students. A day later two former members of the Party Committee were led around the University's campus in dunce caps while the students poured ink and glue over them.

In June a crowd of students broke into the house of Professor Chien Po-tsan. His wife begged them to leave the professor alone as he was sick, but the students refused to believe her and she was forced to lead her husband out onto the porch. As soon as the professor appeared on the doorstep they began to push and jostle him, demanding that he repent his sins. Some young pioneers joined the group and started to spit on the seventy-year-old man who just stood there and wept.

Many professors were forced to clean out public conveniences. Some of them were dragged by force into the yard and placed against a pillory, where they were supposed to stand at attention for hours in a downpour or blistering heat.

The "denouncement" of the Rector and Party Committee Secretary of Peking University, Lu Ping, triggered off a reorganisation of the Peking Municipal Party Committee. It is an interesting sidelight that the name of Peng Chen, the First Secretary of the Committee, was not even mentioned, and the only announcement was that of the appointment of Li Hsueh-feng as the new First Secretary.

The reorganisation of the Peking Municipal Committee was accompanied by a vociferous propaganda campaign. The Peking Municipal Committee was accused of "resisting the great proletarian cultural revolution," "curbing and persecuting all proletarian revolutionaries who were upholding the correct line of Comrade Mao

Tse-tung," attempting to "replace the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie," "opposing the study and application of the works of Comrade Mao Tse-tung in relation to practical activities," "preparing public opinion for the restoration of capitalism and the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat" and so on. According to the magazine *Red Flag* (July 1966), officials of the Peking Municipal Party Committee had "suppressed and persecuted all those workers, peasants and soldiers, and revolutionary cadres who obeyed Chairman Mao Tse-tung and acted in accordance with his instructions."

The charges listed nothing specific, yet the decision of the CC of the CPC on the reorganisation of the Peking Municipal Party Committee was lauded as "a new victory for the ideas of Mao Tse-tung," and made out to be the result of the will of the people and the actions of the broad masses from below.

The events in Peking marked the start of mass denunciations and purges throughout the country. The first to come under fire were officials of agitation and propaganda departments, newspapers and magazines, and university instructors and professors. All of them were confronted with one and the same stock charge: "opposition to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung." This was regarded as the worst possible sin, for according to a statement in the *People's Daily*, "the attitude to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung is the criterion for determining who is a true revolutionary and who a pseudo-revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary, who is a Marxist-Leninist and who a revisionist. Today, as tomorrow, those who oppose the ideas of Mao Tse-tung are mortal enemies of the revolution and mortal enemies of the people."

The slogan "We shall Defend the Ideas of Mao

Tse-tung" became one of the major slogans of the "great revolution." One could not help wondering from whom the ideas of Mao Tse-tung were to be defended. Who was attacking them? In replying to this question, the Chinese press writes that within the ranks of the CPC there were people who were seeking to "prepare public opinion for the restoration of capitalism and for a counter-revolutionary coup." In stressing the gravity of the situation, the army paper declared on June 8, 1966, that "Hungarian-type events could develop in China. Then a Khrushchovian counter-revolutionary coup might occur," and "then the Communist Party and our country would perish and we ourselves would lose our heads."

In another article the same paper wrote that unless a blow was struck at the "handful of revisionists and bourgeois elements," "there will be a danger that the pillars of socialism in our country will be undermined and our country will change its colour." The Chinese press is making no secret of the fact that the phrase "enemies of the Chinese people" refers to all who have in any form expressed doubts as to the infallibility of the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and their universal nature.

Another purge victim was Chou Yan, the former deputy head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. Just a short while earlier he had been famous for the way he had zealously preached the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and glorified his name—but now it appeared that for many years, since the thirties in fact, his one concern had been to undermine the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, to try and weaken his influence on the development of China's literature and art. Chou Yan was condemned for "advocating the 'diversity of art' and

for distorting the 'Thousand Flowers' policy, and for refusing to accept the idea that in works of literature and art 'politics should be the main commander'."

In particular, Chou Yan was charged with being guided "in the field of literature and art by the ideas of the Russian bourgeois literary critics, Belinsky, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, and in the field of the theatre by the Stanislavsky system." In 1961 at a conference of leading workers of literature and art in Peking he had allegedly declared that "literature and art should serve the people of the whole country," a statement which the *Red Flag* held to be a display of the "revisionist black line."

Another of Chou Yan's sins was his appeal to "do everything possible to enable the Chinese people to enjoy the culture of Greece and Rome and the two-thousand-year-old Chinese culture" (*People's Daily*, September 1966). Charges of pursuing the "black revisionist line" were made against many personalities in the field of literature, art and culture, most of whom had gone through the grim trials of the anti-Japanese war and the national liberation war, and against those who despite the terror and the reprisals of the Kuomintang secret police had closely linked their destinies with the cause of the Chinese revolution and with the destinies of the Chinese Communist Party. Many of them had simply been trying not to reduce the vaunting and glorification of Mao Tse-tung to the ridiculous. But in the conditions of the cult of Mao Tse-tung this was treated as a heinous crime. Characteristic in this respect is the official reason for the dismissal of Peng Kang, the Rector and Party Committee Secretary of Sian University. According to a report in the *Shansi Daily*, Peng Kang declared as long ago

as on June 10, 1961, that "the study of Marxism-Leninism and of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung should not be allowed to be vulgarised. This is a typical example of how bourgeois authorities slander the study by the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers of the works of Chairman Mao, calling it 'vulgarisation,' 'pragmatism,' and 'label-sticking'." Peng Kang was alleged to have stated: "If a man cannot climb up a pole and another man reads him a quotation from the Chairman he still will not be able to climb the pole." The paper puts the following indignant query: "Is this not a covert attack against the proposition of Comrade Lin Piao that the study of the works of Chairman Mao yields immediate results?"

There does not seem to be a single prominent scholar in the social sciences who has escaped public castigation of the worst kind. One of the victims of the "cultural revolution" is the noted economist and Director of the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung Yeh-fang. Like Teng To, Chou Yan, Chien Po-tsan and Wu Han, he had more than one article devoted to him. The *People's Daily* asserted that Sung Yeh-fang had become "the mouthpiece of international reaction and an advance guard of the reactionary classes inside the country. Not only did he peddle the black revisionist wares of the CPSU leadership and allege shamelessly that his position was more consistent than the position of the servile scientist of modern revisionism in the Soviet Union, Liberman. His only objective was to try and effect a restoration of capitalism in our country and implement the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."

Sung Yeh-fang had asserted that "in the past a widespread shortcoming had been the promotion to the forefront of political ideas, i. e. the 'politics

is the commanding force' principle..." and that "in over-emphasising the role of ideology the effect was the reverse; that by violation of the principle of remuneration according to work done the development of the productive forces was impeded and, on the other hand, ideology was harmed. As a result, in the last few years ideology has not only been heightened, but in the case of some people it has even deteriorated." Sung Yeh-fang was also taken to task for believing that the "politics is the commanding force" principle implied disregard for objective economic laws, and constituted the basis of voluntarism and subjectivism.

A statement by Sung Yeh-fang to the effect that the general line in socialist construction must be the achievement of the maximum results with the minimum outlay was also declared to be anti-Marxist and contradictory to the spirit of Mao Tse-tung's ideas. As far as can be gathered from what has been published, Sung Yeh-fang also said that the slogan of the general line of the CPC, "More, faster, better and more economically," should be interpreted to mean the need to achieve the maximum results with the minimum outlay. In this connection the *People's Daily* points out: "Here Sung Yeh-fang has lucidly and openly proposed a general line of restoring capitalism in order to counterpose it to the general line of our Party in socialist construction..."

According to press reports, Sung Yeh-fang had criticised the "great leap forward" accusing it of having ended in "failure," in the "disruption of production." He had stated that in the creation of the people's communes there had been "adventurist and subjectively idealistic mistakes." "In agriculture," he said, "we are essentially still based on manual labour and draught animals; the

level of development of the productive forces is still as backward as it was at the time of the Tsing Dynasty" (246-207 B.C.). Sung Yeh-fang also said: "In collectivisation this level should be taken into account... it is wrong to rest support only on the consciousness of the peasants, it is wrong to try and turn the countryside at one go into a publicly-owned enterprise like the Anshan iron and steel works..."

Judging by the articles in the *People's Daily*, Sung Yeh-fang believed that China's economy was suffering from unjustified disregard for the law of cost and material incentive. He suggested "restoring the indice of socialist profit" for industrial enterprises, and in "one report made in June 1960" he termed the principle of material stimulation of agricultural development a "good thing." He urged: "To stimulate an enterprise to work for increased profit means also to stimulate it to struggle for better management and for increased production..." The *People's Daily* drew the conclusion from this that "his views are aimed at elimination of the management of the national economy by the Party and the state, and at corrupting the economic system of socialism."

One of the charges levelled against Sung Yeh-fang was that he had urged the leadership of the CPC to "overcome dogmatism through the study of Soviet economic science."

Sung Yeh-fang's views were characterised by the *People's Daily* as "a counter-revolutionary programme, from beginning to end, for the restoration of capitalism." The paper demanded: "The paper tiger, Sung Yeh-fang, must be run through with a sword, his mask torn off and this black flag in economic science toppled in order to raise aloft forever the great red banner of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung" (August 14, 1966).

The sponsors and leaders of the "cultural revolution," amongst whom increasing prominence was being given to Defence Minister Lin Piao, whose name now invariably began to appear together with that of Mao himself, did not limit themselves to criticism and condemnation of Mao Tse-tung's ideological opponents. In the summer of 1966 the newspapers featured appeals to the student youth not to stand aloof from the "cultural revolution."

The need to mobilise the children and the youth in defence of Mao's ideas is evidently explainable by the fact that not everyone in the Party understood why this hullabaloo had been raised, while others, though aware of the trend of events, were reluctant to smear their reputation by active involvement in the campaign.

The magazine *Red Flag* therefore deemed it necessary to warn such people. "Some comrades," the magazine's editorial wrote, "regard the polemics between the proletariat and the reactionary bourgeoisie in the press as a paper war between men of letters and as something unsubstantial. Some comrades immerse themselves in their everyday work and display no interest in the struggle on the ideological and cultural fronts, display no interest in the class struggle in the field of ideology. This is absolutely wrong and an extremely dangerous attitude..." "'Comrades,' they must be told loudly, 'the enemy is sharpening his sword. He intends to cut off our heads and overthrow our power. How then can you look yet fail to see, listen yet fail to hear?'"

The *People's Daily* launched an appeal on June 1, 1966, to raise the children to active participation in the "cultural revolution." "We must organise and encourage the children to participate actively in the present great socialist cultural

revolution, so that they may become steeled in this acute and fierce class struggle and strengthen their resistance." The paper noted that the bitter class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the roads of socialism and capitalism "takes place not only in school education of children but also in the upbringing of children of pre-school age." The *People's Daily* exhorted that children be taught in such a way that "they should never forget the class struggle, never forget the dictatorship of the proletariat, never forget to put politics in the first place and never forget to hold high the red banner of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung; they should read well the books of Mao Tse-tung, and listen to him, and seriously follow his instructions, become his good children and from their childhood follow the revolutionary path."

The Chinese schoolchildren took these words as a call for immediate action.

Several days later the *People's Daily* (June 9, 1966) printed a detailed report of a rally that had taken place at Peking's No. 1 girls' school, where the students had called for the abolition of exams. They had stated: "The old system of exams in the secondary schools is in contradiction with the educational line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. It is a tool in the hands of the representatives of the bourgeoisie who are using it for the purposes of class struggle against the proletariat and for exercising a dictatorship over the sons and daughters of the workers, peasants and lower middle peasants."

The schoolgirls felt the established system of marks for knowledge resulted in politics not being placed in the forefront. "This system," they went on to state, "encouraged students to indulge in cramming, and learn dogmas by rote, and it im-

pelled them to take the path of white specialists seeking personal glory and benefit." The participants in the rally emphasised that some students were spending too much time on their lessons, seeking to get the highest marks and not showing an interest in politics. The girls took exception to the fact that during university entrance examinations no interest was taken in the political level of the entrants or their attitudes to the works of Mao Tse-tung, but only in their educational standards and knowledge.

A group of schoolchildren from the town of Changsha wrote to complain that "preparations for the exams leave us no time for political activities or the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung, and also reduce the time that could otherwise be spent working in the countryside." They grumbled that "even for the great cultural revolution they had been given a mere ten days during which school had been suspended. But the next twenty days they had been compelled to study and cram for the exams." The students termed the system of giving marks for knowledge bourgeois.

In a letter to Chou En-lai a group of schoolgirls from Kuangchou also demanded an end to entrance examinations at institutions of higher learning so that they would have a greater opportunity "of directly participating in the three great revolutionary movements and engaging in re-educational activities amongst the workers, peasants and soldiers."

On June 6, 1966, the pupils at a girls' secondary school in Peking addressed a letter to the Central Committee of the CPC and Chairman Mao claiming they were "inspired by revolutionary fervour and wishing to express their consistent revolutionary spirit," proposed the complete abolition of the old system of education. The letter

went on to say that "many schoolchildren were studying not for the sake of the revolution but in order to gain admission to higher educational institutions, that they were burying their heads in books and were not interested in politics." The girls in Peking felt such "bourgeois reactionary thoughts were engendered by the existing system of examinations" which, in their view, "serves the interests of the restoration of capitalism and plays into the hands of bourgeois elements." The girls were therefore proposing that the examination system be abolished, and secondary school leavers should immediately replenish the ranks of workers, peasants and soldiers. They also thought it dangerous to postpone this until the completion of higher education "since by that time the young men and women might already have formed an individual world outlook which it would be hard to change," and proposed that if there were any need to enrol students in institutes of higher learning, they should be selected directly by the Party.

This proposal initiated by the schoolchildren was promptly accepted. On June 13, 1966, the Central Committee of the CPC together with the State Council decreed a reform of the educational system. In this connection the enrolment of students was postponed for half a year "for the purpose of the consistent implementation of the cultural revolution." (The time-limit was later prolonged.)

The *People's Daily* emphasised that the abolition of examinations in schools and higher educational institutions was an important phase of the "cultural revolution."

In elucidating the goal of the school reform, an editorial in the *People's Daily* on June 18, 1966, commented that it was designed to "estab-

lish Chairman Mao's line in the educational system and completely eliminate the bourgeois line." The Chinese press emphasised that the previously existing educational system was at variance with the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and divorced from the class struggle, and the higher educational institutions were dominated by bourgeois intellectuals. "New teaching material must be compiled under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought," commented the *People's Daily*. According to this decision all school curricula were to be revised. "The junior classes in primary schools," the paper pointed out, "can study some extracts from Chairman Mao's works, and the senior classes can study more of them and also some of the articles, including 'Serve the People,' 'In Memory of Norman Bethune' and 'The Foolish Old Man Who Reproved the Mountains.' Secondary school pupils can study 'Selected Readings from Mao Tse-tung's Works' and articles related to those readings. College students can study *The Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung. The study of Chairman Mao's works should be listed as a compulsory subject in all schools, whether primary or secondary or institutions of higher learning."

The Chinese press reported that students all over the country acclaimed with joy and delight the decision taken by the Party and the government on the abolition of examinations. Meetings and rallies devoted to this "historic" decision were held everywhere.

When they learned of the decision to abolish examinations and suspend studies in all schools, the "revolutionary" students of Tungshiang, for example, declared that from now on they were ready to "scale the highest mountain peaks, immerse themselves in seas of fire and split open their heads to the bone for the sake of forever

following the Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

The decision to reform the educational system, abolish examinations and undertake a complete revision of all school programmes was not taken on the spur of the moment as a result of the spontaneous action of students. The facts show that long before the reform Mao Tse-tung and his associates had been wondering with marked concern whether his ideas could find firm root in the minds of the rising generation. The slightest broadening of their outlook and the accumulation of knowledge would inevitably tend to subvert the basis of Mao Tse-tung's ideas—something that in his language would mean "departure from socialism," a socialism he understood to mean the realisation of his concept of a great and mighty China. Most important, however, in taking the decision to abolish examinations and indefinitely suspend studies at schools and higher educational institutions, Mao Tse-tung was wooing the youth and elevating himself in their eyes as a defender of their interests who would stop at nothing to win their love and respect. Badly overworked because of the need to cram the articles of Mao Tse-tung and do their military training, the students could not devote much time to normal studies. Poor nutrition and weak health also had their effect on many students. Nor did they have any alternative. It was strictly laid down that they must learn Mao's articles by rote, and this left them with no time for other and more important occupations.

From above they were exhorted to believe that the paramount thing was to "become red," while training for a profession was of secondary importance. Clearly, in these circumstances the student arrived at the conviction that the study courses were overburdened (all the more so since

in several cases they really were overburdened) and developed an aversion for academic pursuits.

A leaflet circulated in Peking in December 1966 indicates that as far back as in 1964 Mao Tse-tung, in replying to a complaint by students of the Harbin Construction Institute that courses were too long, told them: "At present there are too many subjects. In this way people can be worked to death. This is why students at primary, secondary and higher schools are in such a state of tension." Mao went on to state: "The scientific courses can be halved. Confucius used just to teach six arts: ceremonies, music, archery, chariotry, the holy books and arithmetic. . . . If the students do not engage in games, swimming and physical exercises things will not go at all well."

If the leaflet is to be believed, the "great leader" elaborated his ideas in the following way:

"If you take people in history who were noted for scholastic knowledge, there were no outstanding figures amongst them. Li Po and Tu Fu (great Chinese poets—*Author's remark*) were neither Chin Shih nor Han Lin (academic degrees in ancient China.—*Author's remark*). Han Yu and Liu Tsung-yuan were both only second-class Chin Shih. Wang Shih-fu, Kuan Hang-ching, Lo Kuan-chung, Pu Sung-ling, Tsao Hsueh-chin were not Chin Shih or Han Lin either, while it was always those who were Chin Shih and Han Lin who never achieved success. In the time of the Ming Dynasty things went well for only two Emperors, Tai-tzu and Cheng-tzu. One of them knew no hieroglyphs, the other but a few, but then under Chia Ching the intellectuals came to power, and things did not work out. The affairs of the state did not go well. You don't become an emperor by reading a lot of books." Coming back to the present, Mao said: "The present examination

method is a method aimed against the enemy, not a method for the people. With this method a surprise blow is dealt, i.e. the old method is used of having to take examinations on standard articles. I do not agree with this. It must be changed."

Finally, Mao Tse-tung is alleged by the leaflet to have given his view as follows:

"Now the trouble is that, first, there are too many subjects, second, there are too many books. This burden is too great. The study of some subjects must definitely be changed. For instance, in the secondary schools the students may study a little logic and grammar, but there should be no examinations. A real understanding will come gradually in the process of work. It is quite enough to know what logic is and what grammar is. That is quite sufficient."

In a nutshell, all this meant that the school programmes could be purged of all subjects as being superfluous, leaving just one universal subject—study of the articles of Mao Tse-tung. By freeing the students from studies, Mao acquired a vast and obedient army whose free time had to be filled. They regard Mao Tse-tung as a deity whose every word is law. Such youth could certainly be used for any purpose. Of course, in many areas the students still remained under the influence of their teachers, whose authority therefore had to be broken. This is exactly what the Chinese press set out to do.

The opportunity presented itself in the form of a letter from Peking student Li Chang-shou to his class principal criticising the latter for his mistakes. The letter was printed in the newspaper *Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao*, which also devoted a whole editorial to it. The paper pointed out that

the letter contained "criticism, inspiration, warning and hope." "For thousands of years," the paper noted, "teachers have taught their pupils and corrected them. In today's new society the pupils can criticise the teachers and help them." "Among the teachers," the article went on to say, "there are those who are proletarian, revolutionary leftists. Many people have still not completely replaced their bourgeois outlook with a proletarian outlook. There is also a handful of filth opposing the Party, opposing socialism and the ideas of Mao Tse-tung. Under the Party's leadership, with the support of the leftist teachers and by means of a relentless struggle we must gradually rally the overwhelming majority of teachers, and thoroughly expose, thoroughly criticise and thoroughly remove all the filth."

The paper called on all schoolboys and school-girls to "resolutely expel" those teachers who were "opposing the Party, opposing socialism, opposing the ideas of Mao Tse-tung," regardless of whether they were school principals or Party organisation secretaries, and regardless also of their past merits, their fame and their "authority."

Thus, by the summer of 1966 a vast army of absolutely idle children and teenagers had appeared in China, all of whom could after some indoctrination and organisational treatment be turned against those who were not to the liking of the "great leader" and his "loyal comrade-in-arms" Lin Piao.

The Chinese press continued to carry sensational revelations and denouncements. One after another, then in ever increasing groups, "the enemies of socialism who had for many years been cherishing dreams of restoring capitalism" were exposed and denounced. Chinese society was plunged into the gloomy atmosphere of uncer-

tainty, fear, trepidation and grim expectations of what the future held. It was in this electrified atmosphere that the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party met in August 1966.

II.

The 11th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC was advertised in the Chinese press as an event of immense historical importance—made all the more emphatic by the fact it was the first event of its kind for four years. So long an interval was in itself an infringement of the CPC Rules adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. This, however, was something that no one bothered about, for it was common knowledge that Chairman Mao had never been a stickler for formality in matters relating to the observance of rules, and had never been a dogmatist. The significance of the 11th Plenary Meeting, the Chinese press believed, lay in the fact that it officially formalised the teaching of Mao Tse-tung as the ideological foundation for the activities of the entire Party, thus relegating Marxism-Leninism to the background.

By the time the meeting was due to start the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party were faced with many problems which required prompt solution. First and foremost these were the problems of overcoming the detrimental aftermath of the "great leap forward" and the communes. The Chinese Communists were confronted with the question which road and which methods to take in developing their country's national economy. Another subject for discussion could be the

foreign-policy failures of the Chinese People's Republic which had seriously undermined the prestige and authority of China in the international arena.

Was China going to follow the road of cooperation with the socialist nations or was she going to continue her line of self-isolation? Was the Chinese Communist Party going to return to the path of unity and cohesion with the other Communist Parties or was it going to continue its splitting activities?

All these were questions that could not fail to agitate the Chinese Communists and the entire Chinese people. But if Mao Tse-tung and his group were at all concerned about these issues it was for quite a different reason. They were concerned only to the extent that these issues conformed to the interests of their retaining power and further inflating the personality cult.

The meeting met in an atmosphere of mounting pressure on the Party cadres, an atmosphere of the deification of Mao Tse-tung. The *Red Flag* had already cautioned the participants in the Plenary Meeting that there existed a determination to "topple all those who oppose the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, whatever high post they might hold and whatever 'prestige' and 'authority' they might enjoy" (No. 8, 1966). The army newspaper had been constantly harping on the same theme, too. We do not know whether there was any discussion at the 11th Plenary Meeting or what kind of speeches were made or who in particular were the victims of denunciations. Isolated hints later appeared in big-character posters, but they fail to provide a complete picture of what actually happened. But even regardless of the positions taken by the sides represented at the Plenum, the nature of its decisions had been predetermined. It again

reaffirmed the dominating position of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and himself as an individual inside the Chinese Communist Party. This it had been all the easier to achieve since the opposition—and it seems there really was one with its own leaders in the persons of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen—had never formally rejected Mao's ideas and had always sworn by him at whatever convenient—or inconvenient—occasion that came their way.

This meeting saw the triumph of Mao Tse-tung over his enemies—both real and imaginary. "The most characteristic feature of this Plenum," the *Red Flag* emphasised, "is the fact that it raised high the great red banner of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and scientifically elucidated the significance and the place of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung in the history of the development of Marxism-Leninism." The periodical went on to assert categorically that "in our time departure from the ideas of Mao Tse-tung means a radical departure from Marxism-Leninism" (No. 11, 1966).

If prior to this anyone in the CPC had doubted this assertion, they could now either reconcile themselves to the magazine's contention or else look forward to being included among the "counter-revolutionary filth."

The 11th Plenary Meeting issued two documents: Decision on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and a Communiqué. The Communiqué stressed that the meeting had conducted its deliberations under the direct guidance of Mao Tse-tung, while the Decision set the goal of "developing among the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, among the broad masses of cadres and intellectuals a movement for the creative study and correct application of the works of Chairman Mao, and of making the ideas of Mao

Tse-tung the compass of the great proletarian revolution."

Neither in the first nor in the second document will we find either an analysis of, or even a reference to, questions relating to the country's economic development. The national economy as such is mentioned in general terms and without any specific tasks. "The national economy is continuing to develop along a healthy road... For four years in succession there has been a good crop. There is an abundance of goods on the market, prices are stable" and so forth. In short, everything is all right and the situation is exceedingly favourable. Then as the crowning triumph comes mention of "the successful accomplishment of three nuclear tests."

The documents of the meeting give primary attention to the "great proletarian cultural revolution." The meeting admitted that the "cultural revolution" had encountered opposition whose strength was "quite great and stubborn." "This opposition," the Decision reads, "stems mainly from those in authority who have found their way into the Party and are taking the capitalist path, and from the forces of habit of the older society." Yet here again the names of the culprits were not mentioned.

The meeting called for the completion of the campaign for the "four purges" (political, ideological, organisational and economic). On the whole this wholesale and all-embracing purge was termed "the campaign for socialist education." As we know, in Mao's language "socialist education" means the inculcation of his own ideas in the minds of all men and women.

All Party organisations were divided into four categories: (a) those that stood in the very first ranks, the best pupils of Chairman Mao;

(b) those that failed to understand the "great struggle," and were incapable of guiding it and therefore found themselves aloof from it; (c) organisations where responsible functionaries had committed various mistakes; (d) organisations that had been taken over by those who had wormed their way into the Party and who, while in authority, had taken the capitalist road. If this classification is to be believed, the CPC had, roughly speaking, split into three factions by the time of the Ninth Plenum: socialist (there were Mao's "pet" pupils—the representatives of this faction, despite their courage in displaying their love for the "great leader," appeared to be in an underdog position), capitalist (these were the unloved pupils who appeared to be in authority) and the waverers (a quagmire whose representatives were not courageous enough to love Mao Tse-tung).

The Decision of the 11th Plenary Meeting also carefully docketed all the cadres. They were split up into four types: (1) good; (2) relatively good; (3) those who had committed grave mistakes but were not anti-Party, anti-socialist rightist elements; (4) the handful of anti-Party, anti-socialist rightist elements.

Particularly striking here is the vagueness and indeterminate nature of the classification, which fact gave the "favourite pupils of Mao Tse-tung" a completely free hand. Another interesting point was the emphasis on the small number of anti-Party elements. It later transpired that they were not so few in number after all, and even Mao himself complained that only a small percentage of the Party activists understood and supported him.

The Decision of the 11th Plenary Meeting decreed the establishment everywhere of "cultural

revolution groups," "cultural revolution committees" and "conferences of representatives of the cultural revolution," and "other forms of organization created by the masses." It is hard to say whether this was any kind of allusion to the "Red Guards" or not. In any event, the mention of "other forms of organization" offered wide scope for creative initiative—and this was promptly seized upon by the "pet pupils." In point of fact, the Decision, in flagrant violation of the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, encouraged those who were loyal to Mao Tse-tung to set up new organs of power invested with extensive authority to carry through the "great proletarian cultural revolution." The Decision laid it down that these organs would be elected by universal vote. Experience has shown, however, that these were empty words. Naturally, there could be no question of any elections in the confusion that engulfed China after the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Committee of the CPC.

The Decision cautioned the "revolutionaries" against the use of pressure and coercion. "In the course of the discussions words must be used, not force," the Decision counselled. But it also pointed out: "Fear must be cast aside. There must be no fear of disorders. Chairman Mao teaches us that the revolution cannot be carried out so elegantly, so delicately, so staidly and so politely."

To avoid any misinterpretation the meeting warned the Party committees at various levels that they "must abide by the historic instructions of Chairman Mao." The meeting called upon the entire nation to learn from the People's Liberation Army, and the entire Party was to take up military training and carry out the universal arming of the people.

On international matters the Plenary Meeting

reaffirmed the refusal of the CPC leadership to cooperate with the Communist Parties and anti-imperialist forces that were not in agreement with the Chinese views. It was stated that Mao Tse-tung and his followers would continue to see their major task to be to wage a struggle against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They intended to continue this unrelenting struggle "till complete victory." The leadership of the CPC headed by Mao Tse-tung rejected out of hand even the very idea of possible joint action against American aggression in Vietnam. The support rendered by the Soviet Union to the Vietnamese people was termed "counter-revolutionary and double-dealing."

The documents of the meeting officially confirmed the anti-Soviet line which has been pursued by the CPC leadership for several years. Thus, the "cultural revolution" was linked directly with an intensification of the anti-Soviet campaign. To help the Party and the people digest this new anti-Soviet hash, it was peppered with the myth of a "new counter-revolutionary holy alliance" in which the CPSU had allegedly made common cause with the United States.

On the whole the documents of the 11th Plenary Meeting are a graphic example of the "great empty talk" that was at one time described by Teng To.

After their publication the "cultural revolution" gathered up momentum. Detachments of "Red Guards" appeared on the scene, and the anti-Soviet nature of the "cultural revolution" gained in intensity.

The drive to build up the cult of Mao Tse-tung also reached untold proportions. Before the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee it had seemed that the glorification and deification of the

"great leader" had reached its peak. The "cultural revolution" which rose to new heights after the Plenum refuted this assumption and proved that here the sky was not limit. Mao's utterances are swiftly becoming holy writ, a religious doctrine which, as soon as you believe in it, will open up the gates of heaven. Naturally enough, Mao found his truest and most obedient idolators among the schoolchildren whom he had delivered from the burden of lessons and the students whom he had delivered from fear of examinations. The student youth which thus unexpectedly received complete freedom made up the mass of prospective recruits for the army of "Red Guards."

The first "Red Guard" groups had appeared in Peking even before the 11th Plenary Meeting. But they were still timid in their actions. They acted like hooligans and persecuted people suspected of inadequate love for Mao Tse-tung, but they were still somewhat unsure of themselves. Not all these children and teenagers seemed to be convinced of the legality of their hooliganism. Furthermore, adults would sometimes admonish them with words like, "Stop this outrageous behaviour," "What you are doing goes beyond all limits of decency," or "You're going to get it in the neck for this." Judging by the letters written by some of the "Red Guards" and printed in the *People's Daily* and the *Kuang Ming Daily* in August 1966 these scoldings would cool the ardour of the teenagers. But then their doubts were finally dispelled by none other than the "great leader" himself.

On August 18, 1966 Mao Tse-tung staged a review of the "Red Guards" in Gate of Heavenly Peace Square. This affair was later described in detail by the *People's Daily*. In that paper's own words, on setting eyes upon the "great leader,

the great commander-in-chief, the great teacher, the great helmsman," the young men and women, "seized with joy, began to leap and sing the song, 'On the High Seas We Cannot Do Without a Helmsman'". In turn, Mao Tse-tung himself was touched by this display of affection for him and said to his "closest comrade-in-arms," Lin Piao, that "this is a very great movement. It has really mobilised the masses. It is of the greatest importance for the revolutionising of the conscience of people all over the country." (As we now know, to "revolutionise" means instilling Mao's ideas in the minds of all the people.)

It was not fortuitous that Mao appeared at this rally in military uniform—in this way he showed what forces were backing him. Mao did not address the rally, and the man who did so for him and in his name was Defence Minister Lin Piao. Having repeated the now sacrosanct phrase about the ideas of Mao Tse-tung being "a completely new phase in the development of Marxism-Leninism and the highest peak of Marxism-Leninism in the modern epoch," Lin Piao went on to tell the "Red Guards," "We firmly support your proletarian revolutionary spirit."

Broad vistas for "Red Guard" activities were painted in his speech by Chou En-lai. He pinpointed their major task as "to accomplish to the very end the great proletarian revolution in their educational establishment, which means to rout those in authority who are following the capitalist road, to thoroughly criticise the reactionary bourgeois 'authorities' in science and scholarship, to criticise the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes, to transform literature and art, to transform all fields of the superstructure which do not conform to the economic basis of socialism." Chou En-lai had the presence of mind to

admit that this was a "very difficult" task, but nonetheless he expressed conviction that these undereducated teenagers would prove to be "up to" the task.

The rally in Gate of Heavenly Peace Square—and it was followed by a series of "historic meetings" between the leader and his young admirers—lent wings to the "Red Guards." By sanctifying their action with his name, Mao rid them of all pangs of conscience and assured them of the impunity and legality of whatever they did. Now there was nothing to stay their hand, nothing to restrict them, nothing to hold them in check. And they really let fly with all they had. Descriptions of their exploits enlivened the pages of many foreign newspapers, for no one could even imagine that such heights of ignorance and moral savagery could be reached in our time. These teenagers, inspired by their "greatest helmsman" began to change old and traditional street names in Peking to "revolutionary" and "anti-revisionist" ones. They tore down the signs on shops, restaurants, hairdressing saloons, dress- and shoe-making establishments. They proposed changing the meaning of traffic lights, for in their view "it is possible to move forward only at the red light signal" because "red is the colour of the revolution, and green symbolises poison." At their insistence—toilet water, perfume and face powder were removed from the shops because they carried "the danger of bourgeois degeneration."

According to reports from Peking, "everyone who wore narrow trousers or pointed shoes was given a two-day time-limit to widen or shorten their trousers and remodel their pointed shoes into sandals if they were reluctant to throw them away." If such trousers or shoes were seen on anyone after two days, the trousers would be

shortened and the shoe tips cut off on the spot. Piles of human hair were to be seen lying on the flagstones in the square outside the railway station. Up flew the scissors and tress after tress fell to the ground. Watching this scene of mass shearing of Chinese girls, the crowd of youngsters in army shirts with red arm-bands would gleefully exclaim, "Hoao!"—"Good!"

The "Red Guards" ordered all dwellings and public buildings to be decked out with portraits and utterances of the "great leader." Portraits of Mao Tse-tung and placards with quotations from his works were put up in buses, trams and trolley-buses. Car drivers and rickshas did not escape the "ideological treatment" either. "Mao's pet pupils" hurled themselves with particular fury and vehemence against works of culture, literature and art. The book shops were instructed to keep only "such literature as conforms to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, and burn the rest. The time-limit is 72 hours!" This started the bonfires burning in the streets of Peking. The works of Shakespeare, Gorky, Pushkin, Goethe, Romain Rolland and Balzac were flung into the flames or onto the rubbish heaps.

The "revolutionary students" did not forget music. They demanded an end to the production and sales of recordings of "feudal, bourgeois and revisionist" works. The masterpieces of Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, Liszt, Chopin, Chaikovsky and Shostakovich, among others were declared to be in this class.

One leaflet stuck up outside the capital's department store carried the following grim charge: "Your record company has for seventeen years been advertising revisionist, capitalist and counter-revolutionary views... You used to put

out all sorts of 'swan lakes' and other corrupt foreign records... You have allowed the revisionist poison to spread everywhere, you have corrupted the youth and built bridges for the restoration of capitalism... We order: 1. Stop the sale of all old records that have no revolutionary content; 2. Remove all old records." All books and songs which mentioned such words as "freedom," "equality," "fraternity," "peace" and "humanism" were blacklisted for they did not conform to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung. One literary expert was punished because in his popular book about Pushkin he had called the great Russian poet a "troubadour of freedom and reason."

The campaign against culture coincided with a new outburst of anti-Soviet demonstrations. For several days an organised and indoctrinated crowd of teenagers and children—including some from nursery schools, but no representatives of creches—created an uproar outside the gates of the Soviet embassy in Peking. The street leading to the embassy was plastered with posters and slogans calling for reprisals against the "Soviet revisionists." One of the signs proclaimed: "We will deal with you! We will skin you alive! We will pull out your guts and scatter your ashes!"

The outrages of the "revolutionaries" outside the Soviet embassy were by no means displays of spontaneous indignation, as Chinese propaganda does its best to make them out to be. The crowd included some adults and it was they who stage-managed the whole spectacle. Public conveniences made of screens of straw matting were erected in the vicinity of the embassy well in advance (even "revolutionaries" feel the call of nature from time to time) and loudspeakers were fixed up. The producers of this anti-Soviet farce were evidently not at all interested in the presence of foreign

witnesses; so access by foreign correspondents to the embassy area was restricted.

With the blessing of the sponsors of the "cultural revolution" the "Red Guards" initiated a series of pogrom-style campaigns in Peking. The houses of the "criminals"—those who "oppose Mao Tse-tung"—were specially marked with placards and signs. It all resembled St. Bartholomew's Night, but if the French Catholics raided and murdered the Huguenots under the cover of night, the loyal Chinese "Maoists" did not scruple to get on with their grim deeds in the daytime too. One dispatch from Peking describes the following episode: "In a side street just off Tien Tang Kao street the 'revolutionary youth' loaded an old man and his wife and all their belongings aboard a lorry. Watched by a crowd of bystanders they began to beat them up with sticks and clubs. A refuse bucket was pushed down over the old woman's head and they continued to beat at the pail with sticks. The old man, who was naked from the waist up, was kicked and beaten." A Mongolian Agency correspondent reported from Peking: "A group of students from a Peking secondary school who had arrived in the town of Siangyang to carry out 'revolutionary measures' subjected a man to interrogation. When the man failed to answer a question about his social origin, the 'Red Guards' forced him to take poison and then beat him up. The man died. These young people also beat up an old woman, she hit her head against the pavement and died instantly. In leaflets circulated in Peking they justify their actions in the following way: 'They were brought to us by the masses. They could not stand up to our interrogation. We must fight the enemies arms in hand.'"

Such outrages became commonplace for the

people of the capital and, naturally, the townspeople looked upon all these goings-on with repulsion.

However, the Chinese press persistently and systematically explained to the people and to Party organisations that the "Red Guards" and the "revolutionary students" were supported from above and that they should not be obstructed.

The *People's Daily* pointed out in an editorial: "The revolutionary youth and the children of China are the most determined defenders and reliable continuers of the proletarian revolution." "All revolutionaries," another paper emphasised, "must cast aside their useless conceit and sincerely become pupils and modestly learn from the little initiators of the revolution."

On August 23, 1966, the *People's Daily* stressed that all the actions of the "revolutionary students" are "revolutionary and legitimate actions. Those who oppose the revolutionary actions of the revolutionary students directly contravene the instructions of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and violate the decision of the Central Committee of the Party."

The significance of this article printed in the central organ of the Central Committee of the CPC was that it quite unequivocally placed the "Red Guard" detachments above the Party organisations and in effect ordered the latter to accept the authority of the "Red Guards."

"The Party organisation of any establishment or district," the *People's Daily* exhorted, "must unconditionally follow the line of the masses and accept the criticism and control of the people; it is absolutely inadmissible for it to reject the criticism of the masses or to curb such criticism under any pretext whatsoever." The paper followed this up with the rhetorical question: "Why

cannot the Party organisation of a particular establishment or district be criticised and why cannot action be taken against it if it goes against the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and if it goes against the ideas of Mao Tse-tung?"

The paper pointedly prompted the "Red Guards" to "apply the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and be bolder in criticising the mistakes of the Party committees," and it stated that to these ends they "have the right to organise street parades and demonstrations, and they enjoy freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of speech and freedom of the press." In short, they were granted unrestricted freedom—with no responsibility other than to the "great helmsman." Thus, the "Red Guards" were given vast powers. They were officially termed the "shock force" of the "cultural revolution." True, one thing that remained unclear was the relationship between the "revolutionary students" and the army. Who was to be in command? And who was to be rated higher? The first answer came in a *People's Daily* editorial: "The People's Liberation Army of China must learn from the revolutionary youth." But this statement did not seem to be too popular; so a new interpretation was soon issued: "The Red Guard and all other revolutionary youth and children's organisations must follow the example of the People's Liberation Army" (August 28, 1966). This was later echoed by Chou En-lai at another meeting of Mao Tse-tung with the "revolutionary students" at Gates of Heavenly Peace Square on August 31, 1966.

Encouraged and incited from above, the student youth intimidated the ordinary people and then launched an attack against the Party or-

ganisations. Evidently, at the outset not all Party functionaries were aware that the "Red Guards" were acting on the direct instructions of the top echelons of power and that from now on the schoolchildren and students were vested with supreme authority. In some places Party committees tried to enlist the help of the workers and peasants to beat off the onslaught. But this immediately brought forth an angry protest. The *People's Daily* gave a blunt piece of advice: submit and don't dare resist!

"Responsible officials in some places," the *People's Daily* wrote on September 11, 1966, "are seeking various pretexts to suppress the mass movement. They have even been inciting some of the workers and peasants who do not understand the true state of affairs to come out against the revolutionary students, and they have been inspiring antagonism towards the revolutionary students. Our workers and peasants must rub the dust out of their eyes and raise their vigilance, and they must not allow anyone, under any pretext and in any form, to incite them to struggle against the students." The workers and peasants were being given a hint that their support of the Party committees would be regarded as illegal.

Now the "Red Guards" really had their hands free, and they set out to wreck Party committees, Young Communist League organisations and trade unions. In Peking, Tientsin, Harbin, Wuhan, Hefei, Sian, Kwangchou and in many provincial and regional towns of China the "Red Guards" broke into the buildings of CPC committees, dragged out their secretaries and other officials, and demanded that they admit their mistakes and plead guilty to the charge of deviating from the ideas of Mao Tse-tung. If the Chinese press is to be believed, there turned out to be

a great many such people. It will be recalled that at first mention was made of a "small handful," but now all the talk was about a fairly numerous section of Party officials who were "contaminated with the poison of hate for Chairman Mao."

In Harbin the "Red Guards" subjected the First Secretary of the Heilungkiang Provincial CPC Committee to public interrogation, and although that worthy "honestly" admitted his "mistakes and sins" and swore his love for and devotion to Mao Tse-tung, he was branded as an "exponent of the black line." In Kirin Province (North-East China) the head of the propaganda department of the CPC Provincial Committee, Sun Cheng-ting, was accused of supporting the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Congresses of the CPSU. Cheng Fang, a Bureau member of the Shenyang Municipal Committee of the CPC, was condemned for having called the "great leap forward empty bragging" and for having "attacked the greatest leader Chairman Mao." The "Red Guards" brutally insulted Party officials and many famous revolutionaries. They were spat upon, driven all over town in lorries, had insulting labels pinned to their clothing and dunces' caps placed on their heads; they were forced to stand for hours in the sun listening to torrents of abuse. In many cases the frenzied "Red Guards" went so far as to kill Party officials or drive them to suicide. And all the while from Peking came further encouragement in the name of Mao Tse-tung: "Revolutionary students, you are acting magnificently."

In Tientsin the "Red Guards" detained a member of the CPC Municipal Committee and Deputy Mayor, Li Chung-huan, and ordered him to reply to their questions. Li Chung-huan refused, pleading that he was due at a meeting of the Municipal

Committee. Then the "Red Guards" gave him one minute to get ready and make a phone call to the Municipal Committee. After that Li Chung-huan was dragged out onto the stage and exhorted to admit that the Tientsin Municipal Committee of the CPC was a "black gang." From 6 p.m. till midnight he was forced to stand upright, then beaten up. Covered with blood and unconscious, Li Chung-huan was taken to hospital.

In Anhwei Province the victim was the First Secretary of the Committee and Central Committee member, Li Pao-hui, son of one of the founders of the CPC, Li Ta-chao. From the very beginning of the "cultural revolution" the "Red Guards" had been calling Li Pao-hui a "black element." The "revolutionary rebels" demanded that Li Pao-hui be dismissed from his posts and accused him of "subverting the cultural revolution." They staged demonstrations and sit-down strikes in front of the CPC Committee building of the town of Hofei and the CPC Committee of Anhwei Province, and made wall posters castigating Li Pao-hui. But all this seemed far too mild. So in November the local "Red Guards" and some reinforcements from Peking finally seized Li Pao-hui. For several days the "Red Guards" tortured him in a building in the town. During these "questioning" Li Pao-hui was beaten unconscious.

These actions provoked the wrath of the workers and even of a part of the "Red Guards" from Hofei's institutions of higher learning and secondary schools. In their "emergency appeal" on November 14, 1966, they wrote: "Comrade Li Pao-hui's life is in danger." Several thousand workers from the local metal-working plant were raised by the Party organisations and marched to the building to release Li Pao-hui. As a result there were clashes between the workers and the "Red

Guards" on August 16 and 17. Scores of people were beaten and wounded.

From time to time the *People's Daily* or Lin Piao and Chou En-lai would issue a call to "struggle with words not with force," or "to act with words not with sticks." But these calls did not seem to be an order. Most likely they were issued by the leaders of the "cultural revolution" for the sake of self-justification. If ever at any future they had to answer to the people and the Party for their actions, they could always shift the blame onto the children and youth, remaining untainted and guiltless of the crimes which they had in fact inspired.

Judging by the leaflets of the "Red Guards" themselves, they set up preliminary detention centres equipped with torture chambers, and they had the right to arrest and beat up anyone they wanted in their quest for new confessions. In Peking the Municipal CPC Committee was compelled to make public a special order banning such methods. But this had hardly any effect. A volley of criticism was fired by the "Red Guards" against the new Peking Municipal CPC Committee Secretary Li Hsueh-feng. He was accused of attempting to "curb the cultural revolution."

And yet, despite the fact that the "Red Guards" were given the green light, their actions were not always left unrepulsed. In many towns they came up against serious opposition from local Party committees backed by the workers.

By an admission of the "Red Guards" themselves in one of their leaflets, some workers clashed with a group of "Red Guards" in the town of Tsinan. The leaflets stated that the "workers were deluded by the bad secretary of the Party organisation." Bloody battles occurred in

many other towns in the autumn of 1966 too. In Sian many people were killed or wounded. The Provincial CPC Committee of Shensi Province was compelled to express its "profound sympathy with the revolutionary teachers and students, with the revolutionary workers who had been beaten up and wounded."

The Japanese press reported new clashes between the "Red Guards" and the local population in Tientsin, Changchow, Lanchow and other towns.

Chinese provincial newspapers reported that in Wuhan and Taiyuan there had been special show rallies at which death sentences had been publicly passed on the "enemies of the cultural revolution."

An outburst of indignation was provoked by the actions of the "Red Guards" in the town of Fuchow, as was reported in a leaflet put out and signed by workers of that town.

"Fire against the command posts and headquarters!" raged the "Red Guards" in preparing for the attack against the Party committees and rallying the support of the "revolutionary forces." When the "Red Guards" had gathered together over 1,600 people, they led them in an assault on the Municipal Committee and Provincial Party committee, where they instigated a riot. At the Municipal Committee they arrested several Party functionaries, abused them and forcibly detained them inside the building. In the streets of Fuchow the "Red Guards" attacked Party members, overturned the cars of local Party and government organisations, beat up workers and peasants and searched the homes of veteran revolutionaries.

The workers of Fuchow angrily condemned the rowdyism of the "Red Guards" and declared that while there might, of course, be certain mistakes

and shortcomings in the activities of Party organs, these should be rectified by the "established methods of discussion" with which, the leaflet's authors argued, the riots staged by the "Red Guards" under the slogan of "defending the ideas of Mao Tse-tung" were quite incompatible.

In the town of Nanchang "revolutionary students" tried to topple the Provincial and the Municipal Party Committees, claiming that their actions were designed to defend the ideas of Mao Tse-tung against "anti-socialist" and "revisionist" elements. The workers came out in defence of their Party Committee, raising slogans reading, "We shall not let you burn the Party committees." When the "Red Guards" tried to storm the building of the Municipal Committee they were met by thousands of workers who turned out to be less than friendly, to judge by the complaint sent to Peking by the "Red Guards."

A bloody clash occurred outside the doors of the Municipal Party Committee at Changsha. The workers of the automobile repair factory came to grips with some students who were trying to stage a pogrom in the Municipal Committee. The students charged that the workers defending their committee were "royalists."

Bloody fighting also broke out in the autumn of 1966 at the First Textile Factory in Peking. The "Red Guards" who had intended to wreck the factory's Party committee were vigorously repulsed by the workers. The "Red Guards" were beaten up and thrown into isolated quarters, and their pay was suspended. The major newspaper of the Peking "Red Guards" complained that "some managers of factories and plants are fiercely resisting the instructions of the Central Committee" and grieved that at many enterprises "there

are incidents like those at the First Textile Factory."

The outrageous actions of the "Red Guards" who went to Shanghai from Peking to exchange experiences with the local "rebels" aroused a storm of protest from the workers in that city. A group of workers of the Second Shanghai Textile Factory issued an appeal, saying: "The workers declare that recently they have witnessed events which have aroused profound emotion, unbounded anger and indignation. Some people assert that the 'Shanghai Municipal Party Committee has become corrupt and its leaders are revisionists,' and that 'artillery fire must be opened up against the Municipal Committee of the Party.' The veteran workers believe that only class enemies can act in this way."

In Kwangchow the workers posted up placards in which the actions of the "Red Guards" were termed a display of "deeply embedded class hatred for the Party and for socialism."

A leaflet put out by the workers of the Harbin Electrical Engineering Plant described what happened one November morning when the territory of the plant was invaded by student "Red Guards," who "seized the administrative block, installed loudspeakers and began an incessant chorus of quotations from Mao Tse-tung," including the following: "The enemy is on the offensive, we shall destroy him by force." The workers were indignant at the behaviour of the rowdies. "Look," they wrote, "how much hatred there is in them towards us, the working class."

Early in December a bloody battle broke out between the "Red Guards" and the workers in the town of Chengtu (Szechwan Province). The outcome was eleven dead and 200 wounded. At the same time there was a similar conflict in the town

of Wusih (Kiangsu Province), with 13 dead and 180 wounded.

Blood was spilt not only in clashes between the "Red Guards" and the workers. Often the "Red Guards" would start quarrels and fights amongst themselves as well. Sometimes this would result from disputes and bickerings about who had more right to speak on behalf of Mao Tse-tung and be his defender. More often, however, such conflicts would arise out of differing attitudes to methods of struggle or to the problem of what was to be done with the spoils of the struggle. Here the trouble was that in the process of the "hunt for the opponents of Mao Tse-tung" the "Red Guards" would seize money, valuables, clothing, food and various household articles. Some "Red Guards" felt all this should be handed over to a common pool or to the state, while others—less saintly than the others—tried to pocket their loot. This caused fights and riots. Small stickers would appear on the walls of houses announcing searches for "false Red Guards."

It is hard to say for certain, but it is quite possible that some "Red Guard" detachments were set up on purpose by people in opposition to Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao.

One order issued by the headquarters of the "Red Guards" and "Revolutionary Rebels" of the institutions of higher learning and the specialised educational establishments of Peking (the "third headquarters") stated: "Some people who hate the Red Guards have set up special 'patrol detachments' and have divided the Red Guards into various categories so as to use Red Guards to strike blows at Red Guards." "Some 'patrol detachments,'" the order went on to note, "are under the control of people who are acting

against the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and against Chairman Mao." The authors of the order declared that the "patrol detachments" were in effect "a fascist and nazi organisation," and they demanded their complete disbandment. Other leaflets, however, labelled the "headquarters" fascist. Clashes of this sort and internal strife amongst the "Red Guards" occurred in other towns too, not only in Peking.

Although resistance by the workers in some towns and internal strife did slow down the progress of the "cultural revolution," it still continued to forge ahead. The "Red Guards" had too strong a backing. They were supported by the full authority of Mao Tse-tung, which even his overt enemies could never dare challenge, and they had the full backing of the army. The army provided them with food, with uniforms and with arms. They were officially termed "the reserve of the People's Liberation Army." They were guided and controlled by army commanding and political officers.

From the very outset the "Red Guards" put forward their political demands. Whenever these demands coincided with the wishes and intentions of the Maoists, they were broadly advertised and supported by the press. In other cases they were passed over in silence and the "Red Guards" were told to mind their own business.

In the "Red Guard" leaflets naive demands were interspersed with very serious ones. It is interesting to note that to some extent they reflected resentment at the existing order. Notably, the "Red Guards" opposed the payment of interest on capital to former owners of factories and plants. But here they were immediately corrected from above.

Some examples of "Red Guards'" demands can be found in a leaflet that was circulated in Peking in the autumn of 1966. The "Red Guards" who wrote it called for the abolition of all the old forms of services: (a) abolition of the eat-first-pay-later system and introduction of self-service and preliminary payment for food; (b) abolition of the method of distributing scarce products according to the principle of privileged distribution and special service. The bulk of all foodstuffs was to be supplied to cafeterias for workers, peasants and soldiers; (c) abolition of high pay rates and guaranteed salaries for the bourgeoisie. The duration of a capitalist's working day should not equal that of a worker. It should be two hours longer. His living conditions must also be lower than a worker's; (d) abolition of the bonus incentive system at public catering establishments, and abolition of traditional feudal festivals (festival of spring, festival of the beginning of summer, etc.).

But the prime purpose of the "Red Guards" was to whip up an atmosphere of fear and chaos in the country and serve as a means of pressure on "those in authority" who disagreed with the ideas and precepts of Mao Tse-tung.

In the early period of the "cultural revolution" the names of these people "in authority" were not mentioned. The brunt of the criticism was levelled only against the lower and middle echelons of Party officials. But then gradually, at first in a muted way and by inference, then every more openly and loudly, the "enemies of Mao Tse-tung" were named openly. They turned out to be the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, Liu Shao-chi, who until the very last moment was regarded as "Mao Tse-tung's right-hand man" and heir apparent, and the Secretary-General of

the Central Committee of the CPC, Teng Hsiao-ping.

By all indications, they were severely criticised and eased out of the picture, and deprived of all real power as long ago as August 1966, but until November they continued to appear with Mao and his "loyal comrade-in-arms," Lin Piao, on the platform during the rallies and demonstrations in Gates of Heavenly Peace Square in Peking. True, the official roster listed their names below the usual level—and this in itself invited quite definite speculations. In all probability Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping could give no substantial and effective support to their followers and friends in the provinces. In fact they could not do a thing. Indeed, if they had openly tried to come to the assistance of their followers—all of them victims of the "cultural revolution"—it would have been tantamount to an admission that they, too, were in opposition to "the wisest and greatest leader," and they would thus have certainly hastened their own downfall. But by refusing to support their allies—even though they had no organisational links with them—they found themselves in the position of generals without an army and in this way they actually delivered themselves to their enemies. It is hard to judge how matters stood in actual fact. In any event, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao did not immediately venture to strike out at Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. They may have had some apprehensions on that score or else they presumed that after seeing the heads of their followers in the middle and lower Party echelons roll one after the other Liu and Teng would themselves fall to their knees, openly lay down their arms and recognise the supreme authority and wisdom of Mao—and grovel in the dirt like Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Academy of

Sciences, had done before them. By subjecting themselves to this kind of self-flagellation and self-abasement, they would have lost all their prestige and influence in the Party and among the people. And this would have amounted to a new victory for Mao Tse-tung.

But regardless of surmises, the fact was that in November 1966 a massive attack was launched against Liu and Teng. Now there was no longer any doubt that it was they who were the ones "in authority" and the principal target of the leaders of the "cultural revolution." Liu Shao-chi was declared by the "Red Guards" to be the "revisionist black commander-in-chief," while Teng Hsiao-ping was the "number two gang-leader." The "Red Guards" of the Peking Pedagogical Institute displayed amazing inside knowledge of the behind-the-scenes affairs of the leading body of the CPC when they issued a leaflet alleging that Liu had for a long time, since almost before the victory of the people's revolution, been "dreaming of the restoration of capitalism." The authors of the leaflet further wrote that "for a long time the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Liu Shao-chi has been opposing the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao."

According to the Peking students, as long ago as in 1939 Liu had "slandered the greatest leader, Chairman Mao." (One point the authors of the leaflet seem to have missed was how the "great perspicacious genius," Mao Tse-tung, could possibly have failed to discern the true face of his long-standing enemy and thus tolerated him at his side for almost thirty years. Or perhaps the "great helmsman" was simply myopic?) Liu Shao-chi was accused of opposing Chairman Mao and his ideas at the Seventh and Eighth Party

Congresses, of having his own "revisionist programme" and of having "insisted on the study of the experience of the Soviet Union so as to bring about a revisionist rule in China." In another leaflet Liu was lambasted for disregarding the pronouncements of Mao Tse-tung, whom he did not quote often enough. Cited as an example was the pamphlet entitled "On the Self-Education of a Communist." In it, the students found, Liu Shao-chi "quotes Confucius and Meng-tse fifteen times (the ignorant students had apparently forgotten that Mao himself frequently quotes works of these two ancient philosophers,—*Author's comment.*) and on more than ten occasions cites the works of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Of course, Marx, Lenin and Stalin may be cited, but still most important of all are the words of Chairman Mao, the pinnacle of modern Marxism-Leninism. Comrade Lin Piao has said: 'Chairman Mao is far above Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin! At present there is no one in the world who can match Chairman Mao!'"

In another leaflet Liu Shao-chi was called a "time bomb," a "black chief who sends his firemen to extinguish the cultural revolution." At least as much abuse was heaped on the Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee. It was disclosed that "the criminal actions of Teng Hsiao-ping began long ago." He was charged with pernicious attacks on Mao Tse-tung, for at the Eighth CPC Congress in 1956 he had "done all he could to glorify the twentieth Congress of the CPSU and had opposed the so-called cult of personality." The "Red Guards" also charged that Teng Hsiao-ping was "steadily taking the capitalist path," and was trying to "subvert the great proletarian cultural revolution."

In their leaflets the revolutionary students

called for the immediate "overthrow of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping." It is certainly hard to believe that the students were denouncing and criticising Liu and Teng on their own initiative and without any prompting from the Maoists or the leaders of the CPC Central Committee's "cultural revolution" group. Very soon in a speech to the "Red Guards" Lin Piao said outright that "the cultural revolution" was in effect "a bitter political struggle between the proletarian line of Mao and the bourgeois policies of the Liu-Teng group."

It became apparent, however, that the two victims still retained some positions, and that their authority and influence had not fallen so low as to enable their opponents to deal with them by force, without first gaining the full support of the nation, the Party and the army. This is what probably explains the well-known manoeuvres of the leaders of the "cultural revolution." Thus, in January 1967 Chou En-lai called upon the "Red Guards" to abate and tone down their criticism of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and to "distinguish between attacks on the bourgeois reactionary line of Liu Shao-chi and personal attacks on Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping."

It is quite possible that the appearance of leaflets condemning Liu and Teng was but a means of bringing pressure to bear on them and of intimidating and cowing the two leaders—without however subjecting them to any reprisals. The whole thing may well be the result of some internal planning on the part of Mao and Lin who were too hasty in lashing out against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Nor can we say anything definite about how far Chou En-lai's appeal to scale down the criticism of Liu and

Teng was linked with the bloody events in Nanking and Shanghai in January 1967. Was this mere coincidence or not?

The dramatic clashes in Nanking and Shanghai with their resultant casualties among both workers and "Red Guards" showed that there was still a long way to go to reach the "great victories" the *Liberation Army Daily* had been writing about in its New Year's issue, and that resistance was not going to abate with the development and expansion of "Red Guard" activities. In fact exactly the opposite was the case.

At the same time the events in Nanking and Shanghai go to prove that Mao Tse-tung, Lin Biao and their followers are left cold by all these bloody sacrifices and in the struggle for power they are prepared to ride roughshod, come what may.

According to reports from Nanking, a bitter conflict broke out on that city between the members of the "red rebels" organisation and the "workers' detachments of red defence" which sided with the Provincial Committee of the CPC. Representatives of the "workers' detachments" broke into the headquarters of the "rebels" and arrested twenty of them. In retaliation the "red rebels" attacked the hotel that housed the headquarters of the "workers' detachments." In the ensuing battle both sides used bricks, tables, chairs and training grenades. The attackers were doused with boiling water and froth from fire extinguishers. Both sides sustained severe losses. Over 400 were badly wounded and fourteen killed. The authors of leaflets describing these events assert that the participants numbered over 100,000 and included workers from Shanghai and Wusih. They were allegedly aided by the head-

quarters of the administrative branch of the Kiangsu military district.

Another bloody clash occurred on the island of Chu Shan (Chekiang Province). There the Party Committee, backed by the units of the People's Liberation Army and peasants, struck a blow at the local "Red Guards." They retaliated but only to find most of their number under arrest. In December 1966 and January 1967 there were numerous industrial strikes which affected the cities of Peking, Shenyang, Nanking, Shanghai, Sian, Chungking, Fooaertze, Tsinan, Urumchi and others. They were an expression of the resentment of the workers at the outrages of the "Red Guards" and their crass interference in the affairs of the industrial organisations.

A serious attempt was made in Shanghai to resist the "cultural revolution". The sparse reports coming from that major industrial centre are hardly sufficient to reconstruct all the details of what really happened.

But even the meagre information that has appeared in the Chinese press provides ample evidence of the tense situation that developed in the city last January. The workers went on strike at several plants and factories, as well as the port. Some of them did so under the pretext of participating in the "cultural revolution," others in protest against it.

Seeking to secure the support of the industrial workers and without the consent of the central authorities, the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC carried out several measures to improve the material welfare of the workers. Wages were raised and the needy were given rooms and apartments. The Shanghai Municipal Committee was given no chance to complete its initiative,

however. The leaders of the "cultural revolution" got the message and hastened to thwart the completion of the measures. This was done through the so-called revolutionary rebels who branded the actions of the Shanghai Municipal Committee as a "bourgeois reactionary line" and as a "counter-offensive on the economic front." The "revolutionary rebels" charged that the officials of the Shanghai Municipal Committee were "exploiting the question of the material welfare in order to divert the people from the main direction of the struggle and inciting one section of the masses against the other, thus bringing about stoppages at industrial enterprises, the suspension of rail traffic and the blocking of highways. They are even inciting the port workers to stop work and are thus impeding the functioning of the ports and undermining the international prestige of our country. Wilfully squandering public funds, they are arbitrarily raising expenditure on wages and welfare, arbitrarily handing out various grants and encouraging the masses to take over public premises." The leaders of the "cultural revolution" evidently perceived—and very graphically at that—the danger entailed by the measures taken by the Shanghai Municipal Committee. For this reason urgent steps were taken to nip the activities of the Committee in the bud before it had a chance to organise the mass of the working class. Forcibly overpowering the workers, the "revolutionary rebels" seized the editorial offices of two major Shanghai newspapers, the *Wen Hui Pao* and the *Tse Fang Chi Pao*. In a letter to Mao Tse-tung the new staff of the papers swore "firmly to boycott the bait of economic welfare and vigorously to beat off the offensive of the sugar-coated bullets."

In an Emergency Appeal to the population of

the city the "revolutionary rebels" demanded the return of the workers to their jobs. They declared that the turnover funds of all enterprises and establishments were being frozen and the question of wage adjustments should be postponed until better days. The Appeal categorically banned all wage increases in order not to "set the workers against the students and schoolchildren." Those who had received new homes were requested to vacate them within a week. Publication of this Appeal clearly proved that from now on supreme authority in the city belonged to the "headquarters of the revolutionary rebel workers." The Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CPC and the municipal public security department were ordered to carry out all the demands of the "headquarters." The fact that apart from the Municipal Party Committee Shanghai also had a People's Assembly elected by the population on the basis of the Constitution was quite forgotten. The "revolutionary rebels" paid no heed whatsoever to either the organs of people's power or the law.

The actions of the Shanghai "Red Guards" received the highest approval and blessings of Mao Tse-tung. He qualified the seizure by the students of the Shanghai newspapers as the "overthrow of one class by another" and as a "big revolution." In its turn, the Central Committee of the CPC sent the Shanghai "rebels" a message of greetings in which the entire nation was called upon to "study the experience of the Shanghai revolutionary rebel groups." The *People's Daily* and the *Red Flag*—both of them organs of the Central Committee of the Party—devoted a special joint editorial to the events in Shanghai in which they emphasised that the decision to publish and widely commend the Appeal of the

Shanghai "rebels" was taken by Mao Tse-tung in person."

The events in Shanghai were defined as the "start of a new phase in the great proletarian cultural revolution." The editorial castigated those who had attempted to "corrupt" the workers by raising their wages and improving their material welfare. This, the authors of the editorial held, was a display of economism which boiled down to an attempt "at bribery to indulge the demands of a small section of backward masses, corrupt the revolutionary will of the masses and divert the political struggle of the masses onto the false road of economism so that the masses would cease to be concerned about the interests of the state and the collective, the long-term interests, and pursue exclusively their personal momentary interests. The goal of economism is to choke the great proletarian cultural revolution and undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system."

In effect what the Chinese workers were told was: "You have no business getting involved in politics, mind your own business and don't even think of improving your standards, for any improvement is a step towards bourgeois degeneration."

The leaders of the "cultural revolution" showed that the interests of the working class are deeply alien to them, that they are afraid of the working class and want it to remain in a perpetual state of poverty and ignorance.

The events in Shanghai are particularly noteworthy in that the working people clashed on a broad scale with the "pet pupils of Mao Tse-tung." This time they sustained defeat but who knows how the situation will develop in the months to come? Of course, the "Red Guards"

and the "revolutionary rebels" are backed by Mao himself. The "Red Guards" enjoy the support of the army—and it is the army that has the decisive say. The peasants are still passive and politically apathetic. The Party militants lack determination.

At the same time, there have been indications that of late the sponsors of the "cultural revolution" have been stepping up their activities in the army. As the *Liberation Army Daily* pointed out on January 14, 1967, even in the army "there is a handful of men in authority who are following the capitalist path and a negligible number of hard-headed people who are stubbornly pursuing the bourgeois reactionary line." This can be interpreted to mean that even in the army not all is going well for Mao Tse-tung. There are people among the commanding and political officers who decry his policies and some are followers of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. As for the contention that there is only a handful of them, this is the usual stratagem of the instigators of the "cultural revolution." When that campaign began, they also talked about a "pitiful handful" of opponents of Mao Tse-tung, but then it turned out that there were in fact vast numbers. To restore order in the army an urgent campaign was launched to reorganise the "cultural revolution group" within it. The decision to effect this was lauded as a "great victory."

It is obviously too early to try and make any definite and final predictions about future developments in China. Various factors are interwoven in the complex and confused web of the internal political struggle in China—and which of them will come out on top is hard to say. The "cultural revolution" is an equation with many unknown quantities.

III.

We do not know how the "cultural revolution" will develop in future, but it is already quite obvious that it has thrown China back a long way. The question in this connection is why was it all started. Who benefits from the drive against science, against democracy, against freedom, humanism and the ideals of progressive mankind?

More than any other nation the Chinese people, who have only recently emerged from the gloom of feudalism and slave-like dependence on the imperialists, need to develop democratic standards of public life, raise human dignity, and conquer the present-day summits of world progressive culture. And this is something the leaders of the CPC understood perfectly well ten or fifteen years ago.

At that time they had no doubts that the building of socialism in China was out of the question without overcoming the age-old political and cultural backwardness of the country. Virtually every speech by a Chinese leader and every article in the Chinese press was full of the idea that more schools, colleges and institutes had to be built so as to increase the training of engineers, technicians, agronomists, doctors, teachers and simply literate and educated people. The Chinese Communists understood that in a country with a predominantly illiterate population it was going to be very difficult to build a socialist society. In the first few years after the victory of the people's revolution and throughout the rehabilitation of the national economy, then later, in the period of planned economic development, there was a swift increase in the number of schools and institutions of higher learning, as well as evening schools, winter schools and special anti-illiteracy groups

for adults. The political report of the CPC Central Committee to the Eighth CPC Congress in September 1956 emphasised the need to "carry out the mass training of new intellectuals, particularly those who have emerged from the labouring classes, by providing tuition in schools and institutions of higher learning and by in-service training of cadres. At the same time we must use the abilities of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals in the construction of socialism and we must learn from them."

"In order to build socialism," Liu Shao-chi told a rally in Peking on November 6, 1957, "the working class must have its own army of professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, workers of literature and art, and Marxist-Leninist theoreticians... China is a big country and the building of socialism in it is a difficult and complex business. Therefore, the working class must have a vast army of intellectuals at its disposal... The training and strengthening of that army is the common historical task for our entire Party and the entire people of our country" (*People's Daily*, November 7, 1957).

The second session of the Eighth CPC Congress formulated the task of a cultural revolution. It was to "eliminate illiteracy, carry out universal primary education, gradually ensure that the small rural districts should normally have their own secondary educational establishments, and regions as a rule, and many larger districts, should have their own institutions of higher learning and research establishments; to complete work on the creation or reform of a written language for the national minorities, to vigorously carry out the reform of the Chinese hieroglyphs; to eradicate the 'four evils' (sparrows, rats, flies and gnats—L.D.), to observe the rules of sanita-

tion and hygiene, to develop physical culture and sport, to eliminate the most widespread diseases, to do away with superstition, to alter backward habits and customs, to raise the spirit of the nation; to develop mass cultural activities and develop socialist literature and the arts; to train new intellectuals and re-educate the old ones so as to create a multi-million-strong army of working class intellectuals, including detachments of engineering and technological experts (the biggest detachment of all), detachments of teachers, professors, scientists, journalists, writers, workers in the field of art, and theoreticians of Marxism."

It is seen that the tasks were indeed formidable. To fulfil them it was necessary to exert the maximum effort, and solicitously and rationally utilise every educated individual, and to create conditions for the fruitful work of every intellectual.

In 1956 Chou En-lai exhorted a special Central Committee conference devoted to the affairs of the intellectuals to put an end to sectarian prejudices against non-Party intellectuals, for this prevented the best possible use being made of their knowledge and energy in the interests of socialism. Chou En-lai called for an end to egalitarianism in wages and salaries and to other unsound practices. "The intellectuals," he said, "have already become an important factor in all fields of the life of our state."

All these correct propositions were scrapped when the "great proletarian cultural revolution" began "on the initiative and under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao."

But it would be wrong and naive to consider this campaign from the standpoint of its bearing on culture. Its main portent may be formulated in a nutshell as an *anti-cultural* revolution. Its

purposes and objectives are purely political.

In order to understand and properly analyse them it is necessary to return to the early days of the "great leap forward" and the "people's communes."

It will be recalled that in the early years after the revolution the Chinese Communist Party pursued a basically correct line. The national economy was in the process of successful rehabilitation and the foundations of socialism were being laid in both town and countryside. An active line was taken in cementing friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. China actively participated in the struggle for the consolidation of peace and for greater security for the peoples. These policies were fully in keeping with the interests of the Chinese people, and they formed a sound basis for the gradual and steadfast advance of the country towards socialism.

A drastic turn in the entire policy line of the CPC was taken in 1958-59. The second session of the Eighth CPC Congress in August 1958 advanced propositions which amounted to a serious departure from the initial plans. Mao issued a provocative slogan, "Three years of hard work—ten thousand years of happiness." (One interesting point in this slogan was the fact that work was contrasted to happiness.) The CPC leadership took the view that by utilising China's vast manpower resources to the utmost communism could swiftly be built even without scaling the heights of modern science and technology.

The second session of the Eighth CPC Congress took a decision to speed up rates of economic growth. The Party and the people were confronted with the task of "overtaking Britain in the production of major items of industrial

production, within fifteen years or less," "leaving far behind all the capitalist countries of the world within a brief historical space of time," and "bringing about a change in the basic image of most areas of the country in three years' time." The CPC leadership had no doubts that they would succeed in combining "acceleration of the process of industrialisation" with "acceleration of the process of mechanising agriculture," and with the "acceleration of the process of obliterating disparities between town and countryside." The attainment of these goals was to be served by the policy of the "communes" and the "great leap forward," and the line of so-called small-scale metallurgy. It took a mere two years to provide ample evidence of the complete untenability and bankruptcy of these policies. China's economy found itself in a state of utter confusion. By 1962 China's industrial output was almost halved in comparison with 1959 while the gross harvest had fallen by about one-third. A substantial part of the productive forces had been destroyed. The Chinese national economy was plunged into a protracted economic crisis. Attempts by the CPC leadership to put the blame on natural calamities, on the Soviet Union, which was alleged to have recalled its specialists, and on local Party cadres, who were supposed to have misunderstood and misinterpreted the instructions of Mao Tse-tung, could mislead no one but the ignorant and unsophisticated.

The CPC leaders themselves were, of course, fully aware of the true reasons underlying the country's economic hardships. This was evidenced by the hasty retreat from the original targets, renunciation of the "drive into communism" and the postponement of the time-limits for the completion of "swift socialist construction" by tens

and even hundreds of years. But the correction of errors surely implied tacit and forced admission of the fact that mistakes had been made. And though the drive for the correction of errors (the so-called adjustment) was accompanied by incessant repetitions of the slogan of the victory of the "communes" policy and the "great leap forward," and of the infallibility and all-conquering nature of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, doubts as to the impeccability of the domestic policies pursued by the CPC leadership began to spread far and wide amongst the Party cadres, who were much closer to life and far better and more profoundly familiar with the hardship of the people than Mao and his associates. Local Party cadres could not fail to be offended by, and resentful of, the way in which responsibility for the setbacks had been shifted to them for their inability to correctly understand and implement the "wise" instructions of Mao Tse-tung. The depth and gravity of the mistakes committed by the CPC leadership stood out in particular against the background of the successes of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The comparisons of various methods of economic management and of the contrasting results added no laurels to the CPC leadership. It is not fortuitous therefore that in 1961-62 there was a mounting wave of resentment within the Chinese Communist Party at Mao's domestic policies. The materials published in the Chinese press indicated that doubts as to the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung and displeasure with his policies were gradually extending to a considerable portion of the Party apparatus and the intelligentsia.

The emergency measures taken by the CPC leadership to overcome the economic consequences of the "great leap forward" yielded some results.

The state of the economy registered a trend towards stabilisation. But at the same time curtailment of heavy industry, mounting military expenditure and the line aimed at developing a subsistence economy could not assure any substantial advance. At the end of 1965 the Chinese People's Republic fell short of the economic indices for 1958-59 in gross national output, while agriculture barely reached the 1957 level.

The people's living standards remain extremely low. In 1965 the wages of factory and office workers in China were a mere three to five per cent higher than in 1957. The incomes of the peasantry failed to reach even that level. Per capita output of industrial and agricultural products over the last eight to ten years has not only failed to rise, it has fallen sharply, since the population increase for 1957-65 (and in absolute figures it totalled sixty to seventy millions) was not matched by a corresponding economic rise.

It is a characteristic fact that in the period when the bankruptcy of Mao's economic precepts has become fully obvious, desperate efforts have been made to fan the personality cult. There has been a mounting drive to glorify his "infallible and all-triumphant ideas." The Chinese people are persistently having the idea hammered home to them that all the successes and victories of the revolution and construction have been the result of the study and application of Mao's ideas, and all the errors and setbacks were the natural outcome of a departure from those ideas.

It is also characteristic that this new mass campaign for the study and application of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung was initiated by the army, whose leadership was taken over, after the downfall of Peng Teh-huai, by Lin Piao. One after the other the army began to produce from its

midst "stainless screws" who had no aim in life but to be loyal to the "great leader" to the very end. The army also came out as the sponsor of the drive for asceticism, moderation in requirements and rigorous economy in all things. It was the army, too, that produced the slogan of reviving the Yen-an spirit, which harked back to the days when the completely encircled soldiers and commanders of the Eighth Army had to observe the most rigorous economy in order to survive.

In the impoverished state in which the Chinese people found themselves as a result of Mao's policies, appeals for moderation in consumption and for economy in all things were only too natural. But the crux of the matter lies in the fact that, in seeking to save face, the leaders of the CPC gave all these appeals a "formidable" theoretical basis by stating that poverty and pauperism were the actual "radiant ideals of communism," and that if the Chinese people overcame poverty they would be menaced with the loss of their revolutionary spirit.

The nature of the theoretical generalisations made by the Chinese leaders may be illustrated by the following example. In 1960 the famished inhabitants of many towns in China dug up the pavements and squares and used every available acre of vacant land in order to plant vegetables and somehow alleviate the aftermath of the crop failure. Naturally enough, everybody regarded this as a stopgap measure—but not so Chinese propaganda. The newspaper *Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao* printed an editorial describing the experiences of the citizens of Chungking in turning pavements into market gardens and pointed out that the people in that city had found a good way to wipe out disparities between town and countryside.

It was not mere chance that in the period of

acute hardships and trials the army was declared by Mao Tse-tung to be an example for emulation by the entire people. Unquestioning army discipline, unthinking obedience and fulfilment of all the orders and instructions handed down by the leaders—all this was seen as a reliable guarantee against criticism and resentment. Giving prominence to the idea of learning from the army, the Chinese press wrote with admiration that the "warriors of the People's Liberation Army go wherever they are ordered to go," that they "obey orders with determination, swiftly, without argument or bargaining," and that they "immediately do what they are told to do" (*People's Daily*, February 23, 1964).

These qualities were stated to be the ideal and everyone was urged to develop them. (At the time, Mao and the Chinese propaganda experts were devoting particular attention to nightmen. The press emphasised that the cleaning out of sewage pits was a "touchstone for testing the degree of the revolutionisation of each intellectual.")

The drive to learn from the army was carried out under the slogan of making a further and more systematic study of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and was accompanied by the daily glorification of his name. This campaign later developed into a movement for the "revolutionisation" of factories, plants, establishments and educational institutions. Basically, the drive again boiled down to a study of the works of Mao Tse-tung. The previously advanced slogan of "politics being the commanding force" was interpreted to mean the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung are the supreme instructions in any work."

Not everyone in China agreed with this, and many were outspoken in expressing their displeasure. The Shantung newspaper *Tah-chung*

Jih-pao reported several such "unhealthy" sentiments. "Some cadre workers argue as follows: 'It is better to pay for the work-day units once than to talk of politics ten times. Talk about it a thousand and ten thousand times, but still people work better when they are paid what they have earned for their work-day units.'"

Local cadres believed that political work should not take priority and that the prime attention should be given to production issues. "Politico-ideological work is a weak method," declared the workers of the Tungkwang commune (Shensi Province). "Now if production were managed well and the peasants were given more grain and money, then ideological questions would resolve themselves." But "intensification of political work will not resolve the problems."

Mao Tse-tung and his followers tried to suppress resentment at economic hardships by playing on nationalistic sentiments. China was declared to be the bastion and a vanguard of the world revolution. Setbacks and hardships were explained away and justified by the need to accept sacrifices in the name of the world revolution. "How can sharks' fins and swallows' nests be eaten when so many peoples in the world are still suffering from oppression and rightlessness?" demagogically queried the Chinese press. (As if these costly and sophisticated items of the menu were eaten every day by the Chinese man in the street!) The anti-Soviet drive was also boosted. This, too, was supposed to help justify the hardships. Indeed, if the Soviet people had betrayed the cause of world revolution and entered into collusion with imperialism, then from now on the brunt and the burden of support for the revolution fell onto the shoulders of the Chinese people, "the most revolutionary people in the world," as the

Chinese leaders emphasised in all possible ways.

However, all attempts to overcome difficulties on the crest of a nationalistic wave and to divert the attention of the people from those who were really to blame for their troubles could yield only temporary results. What is more, after a brief period of foreign-policy successes came a period of failures and defeats. In the international field China was facing the prospect of increasing isolation. It was becoming ever more difficult to persuade the Chinese Communists that Mao was right in everything and that all who disagreed with him were wrong. Despite the dearth of information, the truth about the real state of affairs did reach Party militants and intellectuals by various roundabout ways. A definite role in this was played by the reprinting of critical articles from the world communist press in the *People's Daily*. It is now hard to say whether this was done deliberately by Mao's opponents or whether he himself was so sure of his monopoly influence over the Party and the people that he did not fear the harmful effects of criticism from abroad. One thing is certain, however: the publication of critical material in the Chinese press in 1961-64 gave many Chinese additional food for thought.

The failures in domestic and foreign policies, conservation of the low living standards, the implanting of police methods of administration all fostered a mounting wave of discontent among all sections of Chinese society, including the Party and government machinery.

Chinese propaganda made a superhuman effort to depict failures as successes and defeats as victories. But propaganda was no match for the facts. As the crisis of the domestic- and foreign-policy lines grew increasingly obvious, there was a marked exacerbation of differences within the

Chinese ruling group, coupled with a growing rumbling and resentment amongst broad sections of Party and government functionaries. The CPC leadership was finding it more and more difficult to explain the obvious contradictions between the true state of affairs in China and the broadly advertised political line. There were increasing signs of internal tumult and opposition.

The first signs of active and, to some extent, mass dissatisfaction with the policies of the Chinese leadership probably appeared as far back as 1960-61. The materials published by the Chinese press indicate that it was then that doubts about the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung and the expediency of his "special line" embraced a sizeable portion of government and Party functionaries, and intellectuals. Mention has already been made above of the emergence of considerable numbers of Party workers who expressed—overtly or allegorically—their resentment at Mao's political line.

Did Mao himself know of these sentiments? This author feels that neither he nor his associates could possibly not have known. Nonetheless, at that moment they did not dare apply any open or mass sanctions against the opposition elements. It was apparently believed that "stabilisation" of the economy and successes in the international field would lead to the general normalisation of the situation and neutralise any possible opposition. It is also true that at the time no effective force had been found with which to fight the opposition.

In reality, however, matters took quite a different turn. Neither the domestic nor the external tasks were resolved. Mao's political line was in an impasse. The number of critics amongst Party and government functionaries rose sharply. Resentment amongst the intellectuals was also on

the increase. Awareness of the negative aspects of Mao's policy and understanding of the real reasons for domestic setbacks and external failures grew and resulted first in covert, then in overt struggle within the CPC leadership. Precipitation of the conflict inside the leading group of the Central Committee of the CPC was to some extent linked with rumours that Mao was ill. It is not unreasonable to assume that these rumours were circulated by quarters close to Mao Tse-tung himself, who was thereby seeking to confuse his opponents while preparing to mount an attack against them.

By the end of 1965 the question of the further development of the country presented itself with full force. By this time the consequences of the "great leap forward" had to a certain extent been overcome—though by no means completely, and it now became necessary to decide on ways and means of further developing the country's national economy. Should there be a return to economic management through planning? Or should another leap be attempted? The question was whether to renounce attempts to gallop into socialism by a cavalry charge and switch to economic development on the basis of the law of planned economic development, or to try, on the basis of the economic stabilisation achieved, to make a new dash forward; to work for the slow but steady and stable growth of productive forces and on this basis to secure a rise in the people's living standards, or to pursue the idea of attaining the rapid national greatness for China at the price of new sacrifices and deprivations for the people and the freezing of low living standards. (The implications of the latter way were expressed very plainly by CPC Central Committee Politburo member Chen Yi, who stated that China was

going to have nuclear weapons even if it meant the Chinese having to give up their trousers.)

The method of planned development of China's national economy and the building of a great socialist China inevitably implied the restoration and expansion of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. But this road was coupled with the need to admit the mistakes of the former line—and this was quite unacceptable for Mao, for it would have entailed the fall of his prestige as the "only wise and infallible leader." The second method required the further intensification of anti-Soviet enmity and the further worsening of relations with the Soviet Union. But this also necessitated the final rout and suppression of the opposition.

It seems clear that Mao and his associates, headed by Defence Minister Lin Biao, decided to take the second path. But then the question was who they could select as their supporters in carrying out a policy whose untenability was obvious both to the Party cadres and to the workers and peasants who had already experienced the fruits of the policy.

The older generation of Party functionaries had been brought up and educated on more than the articles and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, they were also familiar with Marxist-Leninist literature. They had consciously taken the path of revolutionary struggle and they knew that the victory had been achieved by dint of their sweat and blood, and not only thanks to Mao. Despite the anti-Soviet campaign, many of them had retained their affection for the Soviet Union, for the CPSU and other Communist Parties, and it was harder to trick them with allegations about the "Soviet Union's collusion with the United States," and the "restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union.

They understood, too, the importance of culture for the building of socialism, and the need to master the heights of modern science and technology, and they understood better than others how fatal and harmful it was to reject the experience of socialist construction amassed by other sister nations. Neither could they fail to see the consequences of the deterioration of economic ties with the socialist countries. There were, therefore, people among the Party functionaries and among the intellectuals who soberly and objectively assessed the situation in the country and who critically reacted to slogans whose bankruptcy had already been proved by reality.

Mao Tse-tung and his group did not trust the Party militants or the workers and peasants; what is more, they feared the Party and the people, suspecting that covert displeasure might blossom into overt action against the present Chinese leadership. That is why Mao turned to, and found, support in his struggle with the opposition in the army, which was declared to be "the most obedient weapon of the Party and the people" and the "main weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Selected as the major striking force was the school and student youth who had a poor awareness of the ideas of socialism, Marxism-Leninism, the class struggle or the goals of the revolution and who had firmly grasped one single thing, and that was that "Every person who deviates from the ideas of Mao Tse-tung is an enemy of socialism." These youngsters were released from their obligations to study and their heads were stuffed with quotations from Mao Tse-tung. Thus, leaning for support on the army, the public security agencies and the politically immature youth, Mao Tse-tung dealt a blow at the Party and government

militants and at the intelligentsia so as to suppress the opposition by force and, having created an atmosphere of terror, fear and universal suspicion, to prevent the slightest display of displeasure in the future.

The young men and women who are the core of the "Red Guards" have only a foggy notion of the meaning of socialism and communism. They are dissatisfied with their dull and blind-alley life and their natural energy seeks an outlet—and this is skilfully exploited by Mao Tse-tung. The alarming feature in all this is the fact that these semi-ignorant youngsters—at least most of them—blindly believe that they are applying their efforts for the sake of a great and radiant cause and that the outrages they are committing are forwarding the proletarian revolution. In fact, these young people lack even an elementary idea of what constitutes the working class and they trustingly and glibly repeat what their leaders have told them—that the "Red Guards" are the "vanguard of the proletariat." But the time will come when these teenagers will pull themselves out of their drunken stupor—and then some will become completely disillusioned, and others will become cynical career-seekers for whom nothing on earth will be sacred.

The actions of these young people, the fact that they act with impunity and encounter little resistance, is due to the fact that for many years the Chinese man in the street has been conditioned to believe that Mao Tse-tung is an infallible deity. So much so that even his opponents were compelled, in criticising separate aspects of his political line, on the whole to stay within the limits of his "ideas," and to swear by his name at every convenient opportunity. The atmosphere of the Mao cult and deification was one that

fostered hypocrisy, bigotry and falsity. Favourable conditions were generated for cluttering up the Party and government machinery with dishonest people, with toadies and go-getters. Frequent changes of political and economic slogans with continual emphasis on the immutability and infallibility of Mao's line confused the people, who no longer understood what was the criterion of truth. From an organisation of conscious like-minded people, politically educated and principled fighters for the ideas of socialism, the Chinese Communist Party turned into an association of executors of the will of the one and only "great helmsman." Violations of the CPC Rules became commonplace and no one could protest. The present campaign is aimed at formalising for all time this abnormal state of affairs which runs counter to the Leninist principles of inner-Party life.

The Party's collective wisdom is being replaced by the arbitrary rule of one man. Anyone who has attempted to fight for the principles of Marxism-Leninism and for the Leninist norms of inner-Party life is being expelled from the Party. The result is that the Party is being deprived of any opportunity to take part in the formulation of policies or to influence and affect the carrying out of the political line. Party congresses and conferences have been scrapped. Plenary meetings of the Central Committee are becoming nothing more than rubber-stamp sessions whose only aim is to vaunt the precepts of Mao Tse-tung. The situation today is one where it is not the Party's choice who feels his obligations and responsibility to the Party, but, on the contrary, the Party is obliged to kowtow to one man, and if it refuses to do so, it can only look forward to being smashed.

Mao and his group want to wall off the Chinese people and the Chinese Communists from the outside world and its influence, so that nothing can engender doubts as to the "greatness" and "infallibility" of Mao's ideas. Maoism is today being proclaimed the "pinnacle of Marxist-Leninist science," the "highest phase in the development of Marxism-Leninism" and a universal doctrine which is equally applicable in all fields of science and technology, production and everyday life, culture and art. This doctrine must determine the development of China and the entire world for centuries and even millennia.

This entire campaign to glorify Mao Tse-tung and his ideas is permeated through and through with strong anti-Sovietism. The great-nation chauvinism which has been encouraged over the last few years is today increasingly assuming an anti-Soviet colouring. Another feature of this chauvinism is disregard for China's past national culture, particularly the culture that developed democratic and freedom-loving ideas.

This wave of nationalism and deification of Mao has been sweeping away from positions of leadership those who have in any way opposed Mao's precepts. Ascending to positions of authority are particularly active sycophants like Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. It is conceivable that at some moment in the future they may be compelled to repudiate their leader, but right now they are Mao's main defenders and the leaders and inspirers of the "cultural revolution." It is they who have been entrusted with the universal purge and "shake-up" of the entire Party, government and Young Communist League apparatus. The "Red Guards" are but their obedient and blind tool and an instrument for developing an atmosphere of universal fear.

The deification of Mao Tse-tung prevents the Chinese Communist Party from learning a lesson from the mistakes committed and taking a sufficiently objective look at all that has been done—and this creates conditions for new mistakes, and results in new defeats.

In such conditions, when only one man may think and take decisions affecting the destinies of seven hundred million people, the working people develop indifference towards what goes on in the Party and the country with the result that there is growing political apathy among the workers, peasants and officials. This is what gives the "Red Guards" an opportunity to practise their arbitrary domination without stopping to think over the consequences of their actions.

There was a time when the Chinese leaders realised that the deification of one man and the cult of the individual ran counter to the nature of socialism and were incompatible with loyalty to Marxism-Leninism. In registering their support for the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the Chinese leaders wrote: "The cult of the individual is a rotten heritage left by the long history of mankind. The cult of the individual has its basis not only among the exploiter classes, but also among the small-scale producers; it is, after all, known that the despotic power of the head of the patriarchal family is a product of the small-scale producer economy. After the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and despite the fact that the exploiter classes have been destroyed, despite the fact that the small-scale producer economy has been replaced by a collective economy and that a socialist economy has been built, certain rotten ideological survivals remaining from the old society and bearing the seeds of poison, may still remain for a very long

time in human conscience. 'The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force' (V. I. Lenin, *Sel. Works*, Vol. 3, p. 395). The cult of the individual is also a manifestation, in a way, of the 'force of habit of millions and tens of millions'."

These words were written in 1956. But today those in power in China prefer not to recall them. Today these "rotten" and "poison-bearing" survivals have been declared to be the very bedrock of the official political line and the ideological axis of the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

The "cultural revolution" is the result of the inability of the Chinese leadership headed by Mao Tse-tung to resolve the acute contradiction between China's low economic and cultural level and her status as a great world power. Historical experience has proved that this contradiction cannot be resolved in a matter of a few years. After all, this is a question of radically reconstructing the social structure of society, doing away with the survivals of feudalism and capitalism, modernising agriculture and industry, raising the material and cultural standards of hundreds of millions of people, overcoming petty-bourgeois ideology and psychology, and introducing into everyday life the habits and customs of socialism. It is a fact that in the past the CPC leaders used to understand that this contradiction could never be expected to be overcome within a short span of time. The "great leap forward" was prompted by a desire to artificially overcome that contradiction. The attempt failed. The "cultural revolution" is a new attempt to resolve it by means of the former and already bankrupt adventurist methods. As far as can be judged, the designs of the Maoists are to preserve for many years to come the present low living standards,

secure the absolute domination of "Maoism" and the complete subordination of all and sundry to the arbitrary rule of the leadership, and thereby to channel the bulk of the national income into the development of military-technological potential and strengthen the armed forces and the entire apparatus of power. This, the CPC leaders believe, is the only way to achieve the regeneration of the "great China."

There can be no question that the right of the great seven-hundred-million-strong people of China to take their legitimate place in the world community and to play an outstanding part in international politics is justified and beyond dispute. But insofar as this is a socialist state, its greatness and its prestige and its influence are gauged first and foremost by the greatness of its achievements in building the new society, the continual raising of the material and cultural levels of its working people, and their active participation in the country's political life, and the struggle waged by that state for the preservation of peace. To forget this is tantamount to forgetting socialism and making a travesty of Marxism, which emerged from the need to make better and more effective use of the growth of productive forces in the interests of the whole of society and to put an end to poverty and pauperisation.

The vaunting of poverty and the renunciation of the satisfaction of even elementary requirements—material and cultural—all have the aim of ensuring the realisation of Maoist intentions to turn China into a nuclear-missile state with permanently frozen low living standards for the people. The last few years have seen a drastic cut in appropriations for social and cultural needs. The construction of schools and institutions of higher learning has been suspended. Almost no

homes or hospitals are being built. At the same time the people are called upon "not to fear deprivation or hardships, not to fear suffering or death," and the working class has been told that the "rational system of low wages will be firmly continued."

In seeking to condition the people and particularly the youth to the idea that hardships and deprivations are natural and inevitable, the Chinese press, in full accord with the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, is alleging that "it is impossible to do without difficulties" and that they "create favourable conditions for revolutionary steeling" and that difficulties are "a great crucible for the smelting of revolutionaries."

At the same time the notion is drilled home that China is on the brink of war. In the spring of last year the *Liberation Army Daily* quoted Lin Piao as saying that "our entire work is preparation for war." It was also emphasised that this related not only to the army but to the entire people.

Chinese propaganda is making a great effort to induce the people to believe that in the whole wide world there is today no more beloved or revered leader than Mao Tse-tung and that all the peoples of the world love Mao and laud his "cultural revolution." Downright deception and crude unscrupulous lies are one of the weapons resorted to by Mao and his followers in their struggle to retain power. The Maoists want to establish Mao's ideas for all time as the one and only ideology, to lock the Chinese people up forever in the dark cell of those ideas. But the Chinese people will certainly break out of that cell and march forward with other peoples along the road of social progress.

In its development history may twist and turn,

and perform departures and deviations from the main road, but time is always on the side of progress, freedom and democracy. The future is on the side of socialism and though the "cultural revolution" has slowed down China's social and economic development, there is every ground for hoping that the forces of socialism and democracy in China will eventually overcome the forces of darkness and obscurantism.

The overthrow of the power of the Municipal Party Committee and the People's Committee in Shanghai and the occupation of the Municipal Committee headquarters by the "revolutionary rebels" was described by the Chinese press as an event of historic significance which marked the start of a new phase in the "cultural revolution." According to the *Red Flag*, its import was that in January 1967 the "proletariat and the broad masses of working people began a decisive battle against the bourgeoisie and its agents within the Party," and that "this is the phase of the struggle for the all-round seizure of power from the hands of those in authority in the Party who are following the capitalist path."

An even more definite statement on this score was made by Chen Po-ta, Mao's pet ideologist and the most educated of all his associates, who for many years has furnished Mao's works with quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism. He stated that "our struggle for power must culminate in the proletariat taking power out of the hands of the bourgeoisie."

As we know, the "proletariat," as Mao sees it, are those who blindly obey his orders, while the "bourgeoisie" are all who question Mao's greatness and refuse to agree with his precepts.

The seizure of power in Shanghai by the followers of Mao Tse-tung was termed the "January

revolution." It was also pointed out that Shanghai had outpaced Peking in the struggle to consolidate the power of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung.

From the centre came the order to step up the destruction of the organs of people's power and Party committees in the towns and provinces on the basis of Shanghai's example. But apparently the events in Shanghai and the events taking place in other towns showed that it was going to be very hard to eliminate the Party committees by means of the "Red Guards" and "revolutionary rebels." This is why Mao Tse-tung, as the *Red Flag* asserted, called upon the army to give active support and assistance to the proletarian revolutionaries in the struggle for the seizure of power.

The army was accused of "passivity" and "non-interference." In calling for the abandonment of the role of onlooker, the *Liberation Army Daily* on January 25, 1967, explained the need for the use of military units by the fact that the "rebels" were "temporarily in a minority." The paper took to task those army commanders who "in the guise of non-interference are in effect quelling the masses... Our People's Liberation Army must unequivocally and actively support the leftist proletarian revolutionaries."

Towards the end of January the Maoists took a special decision on the participation of the army in the "cultural revolution" which rescinded "all previous instructions about non-interference by the army in the great cultural revolution" and ordered "active support for the struggle for the seizure of power." In effect the decision tacitly admitted that the previous non-interference by the army was due not only to the pernicious designs of "some army gangsters" but also to instructions from above. Chou En-lai later admitted

that such instructions really had been given because the top echelons were not sure which side the army would take; therefore the organisers of the "cultural revolution" were apprehensive about bringing it into action. As later events were to prove, these fears were not without foundation. In some parts of the country, instead of supporting the Maoists, army units began to suppress them.

At the same time the Maoists made a desperate effort to rally their followers, the "Red Guards" and the "revolutionary rebels," who were being torn apart by internal strife, bickering and conflicts which sometimes reached the proportions of bloody pitched battles. Events of this sort became so widespread that the *Red Flag* was compelled to sound the alarm and exhort the "Red Guards" and "revolutionary rebels" to "intensify their organisation and discipline" and to "carry out a broad unification."

The *Red Flag* urged the "rebels" to overcome their parochialism, group sectarianism, ultra-democracy, liberalism, subjectivism, individualism, etc., not to "pursue the aims of ostentation and luxury, not to squander government property." The magazine expressed the hope that the "initiators of the revolution" would "gradually mature politically and not turn out to be just a passing flower in the historical arena" (No. 3, 1967).

But neither interference by the army nor the broad unification of the "revolutionary rebels" yielded the effect desired by Mao Tse-tung and his associates. With the expansion of the drive to eliminate the Party and physically liquidate a whole generation of Chinese revolutionary Communists, the wave of resistance mounted too.

In many towns and cities factory workers came out in defence of their rights, in defence of

the Party and the socialist gains in China, and against the outrages of the Maoist rowdies. In several places the action of the workers was supported by the more politically-conscious sections of the army commanders.

Endeavouring not to allow the "Red Guards" into their plants and factories, the workers went on strike and sent delegations to Peking to present their demands, or organised detachments to defend their factories. Twenty thousand workers from the Tating oil fields left their jobs and went to Peking carrying petitions protesting of the actions of the "Red Guards."

The press was compelled to lash out against those workers who but yesterday had been labeled "loyal and true to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung." Thus, the "iron ox of Mao Tse-tung" oilman Wan came to be listed as a "sworn enemy of the people". Even Peking's famous nightman, Shi Chuang-tzi, who but recently had had "Red Guards" sent to him for educational purposes, was declared to be a counter-revolutionary.

The just demands of the working class and the Chinese working people were qualified by the Maoists as "reactionary economism" and a "manifestation of Soviet revisionism." The struggle against the legitimate interests of the working people was declared to be one of the major tasks of the present stage of the "proletarian cultural revolution." Bands of "Red Guards" were despatched to put down the actions of the working people. When even this was proved to be insufficient Mao ordered Lin Piao to send in regular army units to deal with the workers and peasants.

Faced with the opposition of the working class, the Maoists took the line of splitting the ranks of the workers. To this end in late Decem-

ber 1966 they disbanded the leading bodies of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branches.

With the aid of the army and as a counter-weight to the Party committees and local trade union organisations, so-called rebel detachments fashioned after the "Red Guards" were organised out of young and temporary workers and other politically-immature elements at enterprises and establishments. These detachments were used to strike blows at the working class and cripple it from within.

Chinese press reports give grounds to believe that the peasants, too, were vigorously resisting the purges in the countryside, which were impeding their normal work. The peasants also advocated the restoration of the principle of material incentives, and distribution of incomes according to work done—this was naturally branded by the "Red Guards" as a "game of counter-revolutionary economism."

Many peasants tried to come to the aid of the townspeople "with the criminal aim of torpedoing the great proletarian cultural revolution," as the Hsin Hua agency reported.

The mass of the peasants tried to unite to defend the rural Party committees. In order to overcome the opposition of the peasants the leaders of the "cultural revolution" resorted to their favourite and tested stratagem: an attempt to split the ranks of the peasants. Selected from their midst were the leftist "rebel revolutionaries" who were given the task of taking power in the countryside into their own hands, eliminating the "detrimental influence of counter-revolutionary economism" and showing an example in the implementation of the revolution and the stimulation of the development of production. The Mao group

had to cast off its disguise and resort to the outright use of the army against the Party and to put down the protests of the working class and toiling peasantry. This testified to a new exacerbation of the internal political situation in the country. The situation was indeed becoming more and more confused. Mao had apparently not expected this sort of opposition; so he is now beginning to manoeuvre and practise his favourite method of splitting the ranks of his enemies. Voices are coming from Peking calling for "a complete assessment of the role of the revolutionary cadres in the struggle for the seizure of power."

The "Red Guards" and "rebels" are now being persuaded that the leading cadres who adopt the line of Mao Tse-tung are a "valuable asset of the Party," and that "it is wrong not to believe all who are in power." An editorial in the *Red Flag* said that "to oppose all and sundry, to reject all and sundry, and to smash all and sundry runs counter to the class approach of Marxism-Leninism and to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung."

The conciliatory tone heard in the appeals from Peking in February 1967 is in sharp contrast to the appeals for wholesale attacks made only a month earlier. Evidently the "cultural revolution" has found it hard going in the provinces and its sponsors have had to change their tactics. Party functionaries are beginning to get pats on the head, general encouragement. The *Red Flag* has stated that "the participation of cadres in the leading nucleus is highly favourable for the seizure of power. It is necessary to show a correct approach to cadres who have committed mistakes and it is wrong to overthrow everyone wholesale."

At the same time cadres, too, are being persuaded to display greater tolerance with regard

to the "rebels" and to "correctly evaluate the young initiators of the revolution."

The organisers of the "cultural revolution" recommended the formation of new provisional organs of power made up of the representatives of three forces: leaders of the "rebels," commanders of local units of the PLA and veteran workers of the Party and government apparatus. "Triumvirates" of this sort were to concentrate all local power in their hands. In some towns this new form of power was called the "town commune," in others the "headquarters of the cultural revolution." It is characteristic that on these provisional bodies of power there were no representatives of the working people. And although much was said about the elective basis, and about the experience of the Paris Commune, in actual fact these provisional organs of power were never elected by anyone but were chosen by agreement between the representatives of the army, the "rebels" and the veteran cadres.

Mao's new tactics in the power struggle was proclaimed without any condemnation or criticism of the old methods and simply came as a *fait accompli*. Only a little while earlier, in January 1967, the rout of the Shanghai Municipal CPC Committee had been lauded as a new phase in the "cultural revolution," and now towards the end of January the formation of a "provisional supreme body of power" in Heilungkiang Province was proclaimed a "great turning point in the great proletarian cultural revolution in that province." The new supreme body (a "revolutionary" one, naturally) was formed by consultations among representatives of the three forces and was thus the product of a compromise. It is interesting to note that at a rally in Harbin devoted to this "turning point" mention was made as hitherto of

those who "for a long time had been usurping power" in the Heilungkiang Province, while on the other hand, the First Secretary of the North-Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Sun Jenh-tsun, and the First Secretary of the former Provincial Committee of the CPC, Pang Fu-shen, both spoke of the need to "wrest power from the handful of those in authority" and "under the leadership of the revolutionary committee of the red rebels to work hard to turn Heilungkiang Province into a great school of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung." The *People's Daily* welcomed the formation of the new body of power in Heilungkiang and advised that this experience be put to good use in other areas of the country.

Following Harbin, the elimination of constitutional body of power was carried out in Taiyuan, the centre of Shansi Province, Tsinan, the centre of Shantung Province, Foochow, the centre of Fukien Province, and other provincial towns. At the same time a reorganisation of the new bodies of power was underway in Peking and Shanghai.

But not everywhere did the "renewal of the old Party and government system" pass off as smoothly as it had in Heilungkiang.

The trickle of reports coming from Peking indicated that in some places Mao's opponents had mustered the determination and courage to continue the struggle and offer resistance. Vigorous opposition to Mao Tse-tung was put up in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region, in Inner Mongolia and in Szechuan. In Mao's home province of Hunan the local authorities began to arrest the "Red Guards" and other followers of the "great leader". Reports from Lhasa show that in Tibet the Maoists were resisted too.

According to reports in the Japanese press, an

army unit came out against the "revolutionary rebels" in the town of Lyuitah. On February 15 the soldiers of one army unit surrounded the "rebels" and "revolutionary students" hiding in the local textile mill and, despite their resistance, arrested about 400 of them. The troops blockaded the town and assumed control over communications with neighbouring areas.

Mao Tse-tung and his followers never tire of asserting that the "cultural revolution" is opposed only by a handful of enemies. This, however, is far from the truth. There are healthy forces in the country that are opposing the implementation of Mao's anti-socialist designs. The regrettable fact, however, is the disunity of Mao's opponents, the spontaneous nature and lack of coordination in their actions and the absence of any clear-cut positive programme which could be counterposed to Mao's anti-socialist line. The fact that the Party organisations have allowed themselves to be smashed, that the trade unions and the Young Communist League meekly left the political scene and that the government apparatus bowed to the "Red Guards" is entirely due to the fact that the Mao cult has been encouraged for many years in China and an order was imposed which is incompatible with the standards of a socialist society, the people have been taught unquestioningly to obey the "instructions of Mao Tse-tung." The Party and the Chinese people are paying dearly for having placed their destinies in the hands of one man and for having become "little screws" in his hands.

In attempting to consolidate the various sections of the Chinese society on a nationalistic basis, Mao is whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria in the country and encouraging chauvinistic sentiments. It was with this objective in mind that

Peking ordered, planned and carried out the provocation by the Chinese students in Moscow's Red Square, which served as an excuse for the Maoists to precipitate a new wave of anti-Sovietism in China. The Chinese students, in Moscow en route to China, decided to stage a public reading of the Mao Tse-tung prayer book outside the Lenin Mausoleum. This provoked the rightful wrath of the Soviet people who had come to Red Square to pay tribute to the founder of the Soviet state. The actions of the Soviet citizens who tried to call the Chinese provocateurs to order and to reason with them were exploited by the Maoists in order to stage frenzied anti-Soviet demonstrations outside the Soviet embassy in Peking. The Chinese press stinted no ink in describing the "unparalleled brutality" and "terrible atrocities" allegedly committed in Moscow.

Inciting the duped and misguided youth to outrages against the Soviet embassy, the "Red Guards'" papers demanded "repayment of the blood debt," declared their determination to "break the dogs' heads of the Soviet revisionists," and boasted that the "Red Guards" were fully determined to "hoist the red banner of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung over Red Square," and to establish in the Soviet Union a "new order" in the spirit of the ideas of their leader. For more than two weeks the psychological war raged at the gates of the Soviet embassy. The authors of the anti-Soviet campaign tried their best to bring the aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations to a head and provoke the rupture of diplomatic relations and then to shift the blame onto the Soviet government. But the Soviet Union did not yield to the savage and outrageous provocations of Mao and his group. The Soviet Union displayed the necessary restraint and firmness, and it warned Peking that

the entire blame and responsibility for the abnormal state of Sino-Soviet relations rested with the Chinese provocateurs.

One of the prime goals of this anti-Soviet hysteria is to divert the attention of the Chinese public from the problems that Mao and his group face in their struggle against opposition forces in the Party and the country. But Mao's rude and unbridled anti-Sovietism can divert the attention of the Chinese public from domestic troubles and onto external matters only for a short time. The whipping up of nationalistic passions and their deliberate anti-Soviet colouring will not save the Maoists or absolve them from the need to resolve their domestic problems, particularly in the economic field.

Nationalism can for a time clutter up the minds of the befuddled youth, but it certainly cannot fill their stomachs. And the men in Peking seem to be realising that the time will come when they will have to answer for the aggravated hardships of the people and for the reductions in the already meagre rations handed out to the workers, peasants and intellectuals in China.

It is obvious already that the so-called cultural revolution will be damaging to the country's economic situation and will lower still further the already low living standards. There are bound to be serious consequences when large numbers of workers are removed from production while those workers and peasants who remain at the plants and factories or in the agricultural cooperatives are deprived of the opportunity to carry out normal work in the present atmosphere of psychosis and hysteria. All this will inevitably result in a sharp drop in production.

It is probably for this reason that Mao and his followers are already making up the fable

that the guilt for future economic hardships and setbacks rests with the opponents of his ideas who have allegedly attempted to "upset the country's economic life." To these ends they are said to be "bribing workers and employees, stopping production, destroying and looting state property." The time-worn fabrication about the alleged damage to China's economy caused by the "Soviet revisionists" is also brought into play. But it will hardly prove possible to go on endlessly misleading and deceiving the Chinese people with crude and primitive fables about the "domestic and foreign evil-mongers."

The judgement of history is yet to come and when it does Mao Tse-tung and his watchdogs will find themselves in the pillory.